Stubborn Systems: Two New Multiple Coherent Systems Objections for Coherentist Moral Realism by Colebrook, Ross T.
  
 
 
STUBBORN SYSTEMS: 
TWO NEW MULTIPLE COHERENT SYSTEMS OBJECTIONS FOR 
COHERENTIST MORAL REALISM 
 
 
A Thesis 
by 
ROSS T. COLEBROOK  
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
August 2011 
 
 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stubborn Systems: Two New Multiple Coherent Systems Objections for Coherentist 
Moral Realism 
Copyright 2011 Ross T. Colebrook  
  
 
STUBBORN SYSTEMS: 
TWO NEW MULTIPLE COHERENT SYSTEMS OBJECTIONS FOR 
COHERENTIST MORAL REALISM 
 
A Thesis 
by 
ROSS T. COLEBROOK  
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  Gary Varner 
Committee Members, Linda Radzik 
 Jim Grau 
Head of Department, Daniel Conway 
 
August 2011 
 
Major Subject: Philosophy 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
Stubborn Systems: Two New Multiple Coherent Systems Objections for Coherentist 
Moral Realism. 
(August 2011) 
Ross T. Colebrook, B.A., American University  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Gary Varner 
 
 In Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, David Brink defends a version 
of moral realism that makes use of a coherentist epistemology.  I argue that we have 
good reasons to prefer a coherentist epistemology in ethics, and that common arguments 
in favor of foundationalism and against coherentism fail.  I conclude that only the 
multiple coherent systems (MCS) objection poses a serious threat to coherentism, and 
that there is a way of meeting this objection as it is traditionally construed.  Doing so 
requires adding an explanatory requirement to coherentism: a coherent system must not 
only be coherent, but explain why it is coherent.   
Though I argue that the MCS objection fails as traditionally construed, I propose 
variants of the objection which apply specifically to coherentist moral realism.  Based on 
the social intuitionist model of moral decision-making, I point to evidence which 
indicates that intuitive moral judgments are the cause of reasoned moral judgments.  
This raises two problems: “the problem of intransigence” and the “limited problem of 
intransigence.”  These two problems constitute MCS objections to coherentist moral 
 iv 
realism.  The first problem claims that coherentism itself might not be possible for actual 
human beings, and that even if people are capable of forming coherent systems of belief, 
these systems are necessarily radically divergent as a result of various cultural and 
sociological factors.  The second problem is that the coherentist moral realist should not 
expect a single moral system to result from moral reasoning (even ideally), because all 
such systems will include intuitions which are immune to reasoning.  I argue that these 
MCS objections must be overcome if coherentist moral realism is to be a viable option. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most frustrating aspects of metaethics is the seemingly inconclusive 
nature of many of its most prominent debates.  Though there is a wealth of literature on 
the epistemic justification of moral beliefs, there has been far too little in the way of 
decisive arguments.  The reason for this may be the interconnected nature of many 
metaethical debates: if one believes that moral judgments are fact-stating and truth-
functional, it is hard to maintain a dialogue over epistemic justification with someone 
who believes that moral judgments are merely expressions of emotions which lack truth-
functionality. 
Another failing of the prominent metaethical debates is the relative dearth of 
empirical data used to support any given side.  Cognitivists and noncognitivists, 
internalists and externalists, coherentists and foundationalists, all seem content to 
propose arguments from the armchair.  I think these arguments are seldom decisive, not 
for a lack of imaginative thought experiments and argumentative rigor, but for a lack of 
hard facts about the psychological processes behind the moral decision-making of real 
people.  I believe that psychological research can shed light on many traditional debates 
in metaethics, and this thesis (particularly section three) attempts to do just that in the 
case of moral epistemology.   
With these two points in mind, I propose that one see this thesis as an attempt to 
provide a critique of coherentist moral realism which avoids a heavy reliance on (what I 
see as) stale and non-empirical metaethical debates.  I intend to do this by arguing  
____________ 
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against coherentist moral realism while committing to as many of its main tenets as 
possible.  Thus I treat moral beliefs as cognitive, truth-functional, and aimed at objective 
facts at the outset, and avoid taking any position whatsoever on such troublesome issues 
as moral internalism and externalism.  This strategy of agreement will, I hope, prove 
more convincing than one that simply pits traditional opposites against each other. 
Nonetheless, in order to give the coherentist moral realist a fair shake, I will need 
to pay homage to the tradition.  My arguments in section two are not intended to be a 
thorough overview of the debate between coherentists and foundationalists, but I do aim 
to at least defend coherentism against some of its most prominent challenges.  In keeping 
with this strategy, section two will argue that (1) coherentism need not collapse into 
constructivism, (2) two of the traditional arguments against moral foundationalism 
(intuitionism) are quite strong, and (3) three of the most important standard objections to 
coherentism fail.  Even the strongest of these objections (the non-moral multiple 
coherent systems (MCS) objection) fails, though as you will see, some detailed work on 
the concept of explanation is necessary to show why this is so. 
Where the second section of this thesis is mostly concerned with traditional 
arguments, the third section is concerned with what I take to be somewhat novel ones, 
and it is in this section that I draw on experimental evidence about the role of intuitions 
in moral judgments.  The social intuitionist (SI) model of moral decision-making 
indicates that intuitive moral judgments are not changed by reasoning (they are 
“intransigent”), and that reasoned moral judgments are always ultimately caused by 
intuitions.  I will refer to this thesis as the “problem of intransigence” and argue that it 
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constitutes an MCS objection against coherentist moral realism, because it implies that 
people of different cultural and sociological backgrounds can never arrive at convergent 
systems of moral belief.  I will also point to a “limited problem of intransigence,” which 
arises even if we think that reasoned moral judgments are not all caused by intuitive 
moral judgments.  This problem holds that we have reason to believe that any coherent 
moral system will include at least some intransigent intuitions.  This constitutes an MCS 
objection because, if these intransigent intuitions infect all coherent moral systems, 
coherentism seems sure to lend justification to many different competing systems of 
morality.  These two forms of the MCS objection are stronger than the non-moral MCS 
objection, and they imply that coherentist moral realism must either turn subjectivist or 
become immensely implausible.  These objections must be overcome if coherentist 
moral realism is to be a good account of moral justification.  
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2. COHERENTIST MORAL REALISM 
In this section I will define and defend coherentism in general (and coherentist 
moral realism in particular) against a number of prominent critiques in the literature.  In 
subsection section one, I will present David Brink’s coherentist moral realism.  In 
subsection section two, I will characterize coherentism, as well as its most well-known 
alternative, foundationalism.  In subsection three, I will argue that coherentism in ethics 
does not imply constructivism in ethics.  In subsection four, I aim to outline the main 
critiques of foundationalism from a coherentist perspective.  In subsection five, I 
examine three important criticisms of coherentism: the claim that it is viciously circular, 
the isolation problem, and the multiple coherent systems (MCS) objection.  I will argue 
that all three criticisms fail, but that the MCS objection is the strongest.  In subsection 
six I will elucidate Philip Kitcher’s account of explanation as the unification of our 
beliefs, and in subsection seven I will argue that we can use this account of explanation 
to overcome the MCS objection. 
2.1 Preliminary Distinctions 
In explaining Brink’s position in moral epistemology, I must first distinguish his 
moral realism from some of its most prominent alternatives.  Brink (1989) defines 
realism in ethics as any position which accepts the following two basic tenets: “(1) There 
are moral facts or truths, and (2) these facts or truths are independent of the evidence for 
them” (Brink 1989, 17).  Brink notes two types of opponents of this view.  The first, 
which includes “nihilists, emotivists, prescriptivists, and other noncognitivists” (Brink 
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1989, 18) consists of those who deny (1).  He recognizes, however, that this is not quite 
right, as some noncognitivists believe that moral facts do exist, but construe them as  
merely psychological, social, or cultural (for examples, see Harman 1986, Blackburn 
1988, and Prinz 2007).  These views do not qualify as realist by the second tenet, of 
course.  The second type of opponent consists of constructivists who affirm (1) but deny 
(2).  Constructivism flips the scheme of justification one finds in moral realism: whereas 
a moral realist like Brink believes that moral beliefs are justified insofar as they accord 
with moral facts, a constructivist believes that moral beliefs, insofar as they are justified, 
constitute moral facts.  This essay will focus exclusively on Brink’s coherentist moral 
realism.  His account can be broadly described as holding that moral beliefs are 
cognitive, truth-functional, and target moral facts which are objective and independent of 
our evidence for them. 
2.2 Coherentism and Foundationalism 
Even among those who believe that moral facts are independent of our evidence 
for them, there is disagreement about what kind of evidence justifies one’s belief in a 
given moral fact.  Suppose that you believe that it is immoral to steal candy from 
children.  Why do you hold this belief?  You might say that you believe it is immoral to 
steal in general, and that stealing candy from children is an instance of this more general 
belief.  But then the question arises again: why is it immoral to steal in general?  This 
line of questioning reveals what Brink calls the “epistemological requirement” (Brink 
1989, 116).  Any good account of epistemic justification for our moral beliefs must 
explain how our justifying beliefs (in this case, the belief that stealing is wrong in 
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general) are themselves justified.  Brink identifies three main ways of accommodating 
the epistemological requirement.  One can variously claim that “(1) all justification is 
both inferential and linear; (2) although all justification is inferential, it is not all linear; 
and (3) although all justification is linear, it is not inferential” (Brink 1989, 116).  The 
two main approaches to epistemic justification in ethics are represented here: 
foundationalists hold (3), and coherentists hold (2). 
Foundationalism holds that your moral belief is justified only insofar as it can 
ultimately be inferred from a basic, foundational moral belief, which is not itself justified 
by inference from another moral belief.  It may be that your belief that stealing in 
general is wrong counts as such a belief.  When asked why you hold this belief, you 
might simply say that stealing is just obviously wrong.  In this way, foundationalism 
posits certain regress stoppers.  The series of justificatory questions ends because there 
can be no questioning the premise that stealing in general is wrong.  The belief is self-
justifying and non-inferential. 
Foundationalist moral realism is often called intuitionism.  Moral intuitions are 
sometimes compared to perception of non-moral facts; as W. D. Ross says, “The moral 
convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense-
perceptions are the data of a natural science … The verdicts of the moral consciousness 
of the best people are the foundation on which [the moral theorist] must build” (Ross 
2002, 40-41).  Here there are two distinct possibilities for foundationalist theories: those 
that are pluralistic, and those that are monistic.  Ross is an example of a pluralistic 
theorist.  That is, he holds that there are a number of foundational moral beliefs, and that 
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these moral beliefs cannot be assimilated into one principle.  Compare this to Robert 
Audi, who believes that foundational moral beliefs can be so assimilated with an 
argument from the impersonality of reason (see Audi 1990, 18).  What both accounts, 
share, of course, is the commitment to moral facts being derivable from one or more 
basic foundations (intuitions in the case of Ross, practical reason in the case of Audi). 
Coherentism rejects this approach to justification.  Rather than attempt to find 
foundational beliefs on which to base all his other moral beliefs, the coherentist holds 
that his moral beliefs are justified insofar as they are held consistently with his other 
beliefs.  Somewhat more formally, coherentism holds that “the justification for a moral 
belief p depends on, among other things, another moral belief q, whose justification 
consists in part in the fact that it is appropriately related to p” (Brink 1989, 130).  The 
overall justificatory strategy of coherentism is one in which we “make trade-offs among 
the various levels of moral belief in response to conflicts among them…until we achieve 
maximum coherence among all our beliefs” (ibid., 131).  Importantly, the degree of 
justification is proportional to the degree of coherence, and as such, a very incoherent 
moral system is far less justified than a highly coherent moral system.  A perfectly 
coherent moral system would be considered perfectly justified. 
Brink takes coherentism in ethics to be “essentially John Rawls’ method of wide 
reflective equilibrium” (Brink 1989, 104).1  Rawls defines wide reflective equilibrium 
the following way: 
                                               
1 I here ignore the distinction between wide and narrow reflective equilibrium, as I do not believe it is 
important to the case at hand.  If questions arise, consider this thesis to be construing coherentism as 
operating through wide reflective equilibrium. 
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Justification rests upon the entire conception and how it fits with and organizes 
our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium…justification is a matter of 
the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one 
coherent view. (Rawls 1971, 507) 
 
Coherence is (usually) obtained through a gradual process of reshaping one’s beliefs.  To 
illustrate this process, consider the following example.  Suppose I believe that eating my 
beagle Herbert (under normal conditions) is wrong.  In order to justify this belief using 
reflective equilibrium, it must cohere with my other beliefs (such as the moral belief that 
I should not eat my pets, the non-moral belief that Herbert is a conscious being, etc.).  
But suppose I hold other beliefs that are not coherent with this one.  You might point out 
that I eat the meat of other animals, and that those animals are not different from Herbert 
in any morally relevant way.  When faced with this contradiction, one of three things 
must happen if my beliefs are to remain justified.  (1) I may change my opinion on meat-
eating, (2) I may change my opinion on eating Herbert, or (3) I may appeal to other 
beliefs in an attempt to maintain coherence (perhaps I believe that dogs have souls 
whereas other animals do not, thus giving me a morally relevant category that Herbert 
satisfies and other animals do not).  These are all strategies for maintaining the 
coherence of my system of morality, which (according to RE), justifies my holding that 
system.  Importantly, if I simply accept the inconsistency and resort to special-pleading 
in Herbert’s case (perhaps because I am emotionally attached to him), all of my beliefs 
lose a degree of justification.  This, in short, is the method of reflective equilibrium. 
2.3 Coherentism Does Not Imply Constructivism 
 As Brink is a coherentist, it is legitimate to ask whether one can be both a 
coherentist and a moral realist at the same time.  After all, should we not see the process 
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of reflective equilibrium as an example of constructivism in ethics?  Brink thinks we 
need not, and that we have good reasons for thinking of reflective equilibrium as a 
process of discovery, not construction.   
Brink points to the fact that “the correctness of our moral beliefs appears to be 
independent not only of our actual justification for holding them but even of ideal 
justification” (Brink 1989, 31).  He argues that moral beliefs (at least in an everyday 
context) seem to be fact stating.  When we argue with others about moral questions, we 
seem to think we are getting at some kind of moral knowledge.  And while knowledge 
implies true belief, justification does not (Brink 1989, 31).  We can still ask whether 
someone’s moral beliefs are true, even if we postulate that her moral beliefs are ideally 
justified.  The constructivist must disallow this question, or give it a non-literal reading, 
because she identifies moral facts with those moral beliefs which are (perhaps ideally) 
justified.  Constructivism, then, does not give us what we (intuitively) think morality 
ought to: a way for us to be justified, yet wrong. 
Brink recognizes that a different version of constructivism might be able to 
handle this objection.  We might be able to identify truth with justification “at the limit 
of rational inquiry” (Brink 1989, 32).  That is, once we have all the non-moral facts, we 
can recognize that some of our previous moral beliefs were false.  In this way, a more 
sophisticated version of constructivism would hold that we can recognize some moral 
beliefs are false, though they were justified at the time they were held.  Brink is not 
satisfied with this, because one can still raise skeptical possibilities where justification 
for our moral beliefs obtains but the truth of those beliefs does not.  He notes that “our 
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considered moral beliefs about the morality of, say, particular actions or kinds of actions 
play a central role in constructing and testing moral theories,” and these theories in turn 
allow us to correct isolated errors we sometimes make in our moral judgments (Brink 
1989, 34).  The problem is that this method does not preclude the possibility of holding a 
coherent (and thus justified) system of moral beliefs, yet being systematically mistaken. 
Even if we imagine that we are in possession of all of the correct non-moral beliefs, this 
does not guarantee we will have all of the correct moral beliefs.  Brink believes that our 
ability to conceive of such a skeptical possibility shows that we do not (even in idealized 
situations) think that justified moral belief entails moral knowledge. 
In his consideration of Rawls’s Kantian Constructivism, Brink makes another 
important point against constructivism in general.  Rawls (according to Brink) holds that 
there are many competing ideals of a person (that is, what people want to be, or how 
they ought to be) which cannot be adjudicated, and this has implications for the truth of 
moral realism: 
Because of the importance of ideals of the person in moral theory and the 
underdetermination of ideals of the person, the truth of moral theories must be 
defined in terms of, or relativized to, those moral beliefs about persons upon 
which those theories depend (evidentially).  But this implies that moral facts are 
evidence-dependent rather than evidence-independent. (Brink 1987, 84) 
 
 As you can see, this form of evidence-dependence derives from the 
underdetermination of moral theories, which in turn derives from the multiplicity of 
different ideals of a person.  Brink notes, however, that underdetermination in the realm 
of theory choice only results in our inability to choose between theories, not in the 
evidence-dependence of the facts in question.  Because the realist asserts that there are 
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moral facts, underdetermination only means that some moral facts may be inaccessible.  
Of course, if the underdetermination is severe enough, constructivism might be a better 
metaethical explanation than realism (Brink 1987, 84). 
 Even so, Brink believes that we can concede that conflicting ideals of the person 
underdetermine the choice of moral theories without moral theories being 
underdetermined in general.  Because Brink subscribes to a coherentist moral 
epistemology, even ideals of the person are in principle revisable.  We have no reason to 
suppose that ideals of the person are the only means of determining moral theory choice.  
If these ideals are not consistent with other considered moral beliefs, this provides us 
with a good impetus for changing them. 
 From this criticism, we might extract a more general lesson about Brink’s 
response to constructivism.  If constructivism is defended by appeal to the 
underdetermination of moral theory by the available facts, Brink can (in keeping with 
coherentism) respond by pointing to other facts that might provide this determination.  
Only if all the facts (moral and non-moral) underdetermine a choice of theory will we 
find constructivism to be a viable alternative.  Even then, we might imagine Brink 
saying, this might not lead us to think that moral facts are evidence-dependent, but rather 
that we lack evidence for deciding between a few justified moral theories.  
Underdetermination, in short, does not imply constructivism, nor does it imply 
relativism. 
 Brink’s overall line against constructivism derives from the failure of 
constructivism to provide good reasons for identifying moral truth with moral 
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justification.  Not only does this position get the phenomenology of moral reasoning 
wrong, it fails to account for skeptical possibilities where a person is systematically 
mistaken.  In such cases, we think that a person is justified but wrong.  Moreover, even if 
our moral theories are underdetermined, this does not mean that the facts in question 
(both moral and non-moral) are evidence-dependent. 
This covers the negative case against constructivism, but Brink must still provide 
a positive account of how evidence-independent facts operate within a coherentist 
epistemology.  The evidence-independent, realist nature of moral facts is justified not by 
an alteration of the structure of coherentism, but by a suggestion about its content.  He 
argues that “the coherence of a belief p with, among other things, realist second-order 
beliefs about p is evidence of p’s objective truth” (Brink 1989, 131).  Specifically, moral 
beliefs “are beliefs about moral properties and their instances (e.g., beliefs about what 
moral principles are true and about which actions are right).  Second-order beliefs about 
morality, by contrast, are nonmoral beliefs about the relation between our moral beliefs 
and the world” (Brink 1989, 131).  These realist second-order beliefs are in turn justified 
by their being held as part of a coherent system of beliefs. 
In summary, Brink holds that coherence is not only a good method of providing 
justification for moral beliefs, but that coherentism is not committed to constructivism in 
ethics.  Because Brink’s account is wedded to coherentism, it is worth mentioning some 
of the reasons for preferring this account of justification over foundationalism.  I will 
cover these in the next section, then move on to some of the most prominent critiques of 
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the account.  For Brink’s moral realism to succeed, there must be good arguments both 
against foundationalism and in defense of coherentism. 
2.4 Three Arguments Against Foundationalism 
 First I will consider three arguments against foundationalism.  The first is the 
claim that self-justifying beliefs are impossible.  The second and third arguments 
concern moral foundationalism (intuitionism), with the second claiming that intuitionism 
is committed to the existence of a mysterious faculty of moral perception, and the third 
claiming that intuitionism is incompatible with descriptive moral relativism. 
Recall that foundationalism is an instance of (3), which claims that all beliefs are 
justified linearly, but that not all beliefs are justified inferentially.  It is this claim that 
allows the foundationalist to argue that there are certain self-justifying, non-inferential 
beliefs which form the foundation of our justified beliefs.  Brink thinks that this claim is 
untenable, because self-justifying beliefs “can be regarded as the limiting case of circular 
reasoning” (Brink 1989, 16).  Suppose one holds a belief p that is ostensibly self-
justifying.  Brink thinks that “in order to be justified in holding one’s belief p, one must 
have reason to hold p to be true” (ibid.).  The foundationalist needs to say that one’s 
reason for holding p is p itself.  But this obviously cannot be the case if p is a first-order 
belief, because if that were the case, p would target the world, not itself.  Thus if p is a 
first-order belief, one must have a further belief, q: “My belief p is true.”  On this basis, 
Brink thinks that “no belief about the world can also be the reason for thinking that that 
belief is true” (Brink 1989, 117). 
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The basis for this claim might need some elaboration.  Take the following 
ostensibly non-inferential belief: “there is a phone on the table.”  This is a first-order, 
world-directed belief.  Brink’s line seems to be that we cannot possibly think that such a 
belief is justified by merely holding it.  Rather, there are a number of background beliefs 
at play here.  For example, for this first belief to be justified, I must believe that I am a 
good detector of medium-sized objects in good lighting (Brink 1989, 127).  If I did not 
have such a belief, my belief that I see a phone on the table seems to lack justification.  
This point generalizes: no matter what the worldly object, my belief about it seems to 
need justification from other beliefs about my ability to detect it.  And these beliefs must 
always be second-order beliefs, directed at the first experiential belief. 
There may be counterexamples to this general point, however.  Consider this 
belief: “There is a phone on the table and I believe I am a good detector of such things in 
these conditions.”  The foundationalist might point to such beliefs as an example of a 
self-justifying, world-directed belief.  But it does seem possible to ask for a justification 
of such a belief.  Why should I believe both conjuncts of the proposition?  Perhaps 
because I hold the belief, “I have seldom been deceived when I have been in conditions 
like this.”  The foundationalist could of course incorporate this belief into the first, 
producing another putatively self-justifying conjunctive belief.  But again, we can see 
that even that belief seems to rely on further beliefs.  It seems clear that such a strategy 
would ultimately either fall into an infinitely long conjunctive belief or some kind of 
recursive, non-linear conjunctive belief.  It seems that Brink is correct here: any world-
directed belief seems to need justification from some other belief. 
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Another possible alternative for the foundationalist would be to base 
foundational beliefs on analytic truths, which of course cannot be negated without 
contradiction.  But there is an immediate problem here.  Because analytic truths are not 
world-directed (the world could be completely different, yet they would still be true), it 
seems that the foundationalist would not get any more than obvious tautologies for 
foundational beliefs.  If this is the case, it seems difficult to see how any synthetic beliefs 
could be justified, because justification from one’s foundational beliefs is inferential.  
Therefore it seems plausible that Brink’s point against the foundationalist is sound: first 
order beliefs must always have second-order beliefs to justify them.   
The second critique of foundationalism applies specifically to theories which use 
foundationalism as a method of justification for moral beliefs.  As mentioned before, 
foundationalism combined with realism about moral facts is often called intuitionism.  
Intuitionism claims that there are certain foundational moral beliefs from which we 
derive our other (justified) moral beliefs.  As such, when we ask whether one of our 
moral beliefs is justified, we must be able to reduce it (possibly inferentially through 
other beliefs) to some foundational moral belief. 
The most important historical critique of intuitionism is the claim that it posits a 
special faculty of the mind capable of detecting (perhaps in a manner akin to perception) 
the moral rightness or wrongness of a given action.  Such a faculty seems quite 
mysterious.  Despite his criticism of foundationalism, Brink is skeptical of this critique.  
He claims that intuitionism is not committed to the existence of any particular type of 
moral sense.  Rather, “like nonmoral perceptual beliefs, [moral beliefs might] concern 
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the properties of particular people and particular events and … not result from any 
conscious inference” (Brink 1989, 110).  In line with Brink’s view about moral 
properties (see Brink 1989, 175), we might say that moral properties supervene on 
natural properties.  If this is the case, the intuitionist might say that we perceive natural 
states of affairs and their attendant properties, and that some sets of these properties 
constitute certain moral states of affairs as well.  We see the moral properties of certain 
natural states of affairs in the same way that we see the economic properties of certain 
states of affairs.  Like economic theory, moral theory is just another conceptual category; 
it is a way of seeing the world. 
The third criticism of foundationalism as a method of moral justification is more 
decisive.  The gist of the argument is that intuitionism relies on the claim that there are 
self-justifying foundational moral beliefs, but that the truth of descriptive moral 
relativism entails that these beliefs do not exist.  First we must get clear on what 
descriptive moral relativism entails.  This is the claim that there is radical disagreement 
about morality.  This is a fairly uncontroversial thesis, even for moral realists; it is 
difficult to deny that different cultures have different moral rules, and that what counts 
as permissible in one culture is often impermissible in another.  Second, we should be 
clear that this argument only applies to foundationalists who claim that foundational 
moral beliefs lead to moral knowledge which is objective and cross-cultural.  
Foundationalists who accept some form of relativism are not affected by this argument. 
With these two points in mind, let us consider how the foundationalist would 
respond this argument.  Brink notes that there is one common response: one can “appeal 
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to the principle of noncontradiction to deny the existence of conflicting moral intuitions 
… People may hold conflicting moral views quite firmly, but these moral views need not 
be foundational” (Brink 1989, 111).  The intuitionist might even claim that certain self-
justifying beliefs are not immediately self-evident.  Rather, they are mediately self-
evident: we may need to subject our beliefs to a thorough dialectical investigation to 
determine which beliefs are in fact self-evident (Brink 1989, 112). 
There are a number of problems with this claim.  First, one may doubt that the 
outcome of such a dialectic procedure will arrive at self-evident moral beliefs.  Without 
going into a detailed anthropological survey, it still seems fair to say that intercultural 
(and even interpersonal) moral disagreement runs quite deep.  There is a real danger of 
the intuitionist simply reaffirming the beliefs which are strongly embedded in her culture 
and upbringing.  The intuitionist’s position thus depends on the questionable claim that a 
dialectical procedure would eventually result in self-evident moral beliefs.  If it does not, 
she must claim that the procedure has gone awry somewhere.  Second, one may ask how 
we know that these supposedly self-evident moral beliefs are in fact true; simply 
claiming they are self-justifying is not necessarily enough to preclude this question.  
Here, the intuitionist must simply deny that such a question is possible.  But it is difficult 
to determine a reasoned basis for such a denial, especially if (as seems likely) there 
remains strong disagreement at the end of the dialectical procedure, or if there is 
disagreement about how the dialectic is to proceed in the first place. 
Intuitionism, then, seems like a difficult position to hold.  Because every world-
directed belief must be a first-order belief, it is not obvious that self-justifying moral 
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beliefs can exist at all.  Moreover, it is even less obvious that we would be able to 
determine exactly what these beliefs might be.  If a coherentist account of the 
justificiation of moral beliefs is possible, it will most certainly avoid the first objection 
(and possibly the third as well).  But there are a few important arguments against 
coherentism that we must also consider before endorsing such a position. 
2.5 Three Criticisms of Coherentism 
 There are three important criticisms of coherentism: the regress argument, the 
isolation objection, and the multiple coherent systems (MCS) objection.  I will consider 
each of these in turn, though two (moral) species of the latter objection will occupy 
much of the third section.  I contend that the regress argument and the isolation objection 
fail, but that the MCS objection is more difficult to deal with. 
We will consider the regress argument first.  Recall the three options mentioned 
earlier in accommodating the epistemological requirement: “(1) all justification is both 
inferential and linear; (2) although all justification is inferential, it is not all linear; and 
(3) although all justification is linear, it is not inferential” (Brink 1989, 116).2  The 
regress argument claims that (1) involves a vicious regress, and that only 
foundationalism can stop such a regress.  Moreover, it claims that (2) (which represents 
coherentism) “succeeds only in trading the vicious regress in (1) for vicious circularity” 
(Brink 1989, 105). 
To see why (1) (“all justification is both linear and inferential”) might lead to a 
vicious regress, we need only consider its two requirements.  First, the requirement of 
                                               
2 “Linear” justification is justification which never loops back on itself. 
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linearity holds that if a belief P is justified by another belief Q, that belief Q cannot 
(even through a series of other beliefs) be justified by belief P.  The linearity 
requirement thus excludes all possible cases of inferential loops (and such loops are 
necessary for coherentism).  Second, because all justification must be inferential, this 
excludes non-inferential, self-justifying beliefs on which foundationalism relies.  So, 
because (1) rules out circular inferences and non-inferential justification, it does not 
provide a way of ultimately justifying beliefs.  Under (1), when we ask why our belief P 
is justified, we may say that it is justified by another belief Q.  But because Q cannot be 
self-justifying, and cannot be justified by P, it must be justified by a different belief, R, 
which in turn must be justified, and so on.  If we accept (1), it seems we are required to 
provide an infinite number of beliefs in order to obtain justification.  This is surely 
implausible, not only because it seems psychologically impossible that we could have an 
infinite number of beliefs, but because even if we did, it does not seem we could ever 
actually get justification from such an infinite series.  This regress is vicious because it 
can never obtain the justification it seeks to provide. 
Of course, coherentism rejects (1) as well, so the key part of the argument in 
favor of foundationalism is the claim that (2) represents a case of vicious circular 
reasoning.  Brink believes that this claim can be overcome.  He notes that there are two 
different kinds of epistemic justification: contextualist and systematic.  Systematic 
justification “results from consistently applying the epistemological requirement that 
justifying beliefs be justified” (Brink 1989, 123).  Contextualist justification is “partial 
or incomplete justification and results from refusing to apply the epistemological 
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requirement consistently” (Brink 1989, 123).  Brink believes that we justify our beliefs 
in everyday life using contextualist justification.  We do not thoroughly apply the 
epistemological requirement (that every justifying belief itself be justified), and as a 
result, the process of justification we engage in is generally short and linear.  When I am 
asked why I believe stealing candy from children is wrong, it is not usually expedient for 
me to do more than justify my belief based on the belief that stealing in general is 
wrong.  I do not (unless I am philosophizing) ask why stealing in general is wrong.  This 
psychological bias leads to people to believe that systematic justification will look 
something like contextualist justification (that is, short and linear!).  Brink thinks this is 
not the case.  Rather, he contends that if I were to question the justification of my 
justifying beliefs (and thus ask for systematic, rather than contextualist justification), I 
would have to bring in many background beliefs that are themselves only justified 
because they are held as a coherent system.  This is the strategy at work in (2), where the 
linearity requirement for justification is dropped.  As Brink argues, “there is no clear 
reason to suppose that linearity can or need be preserved when the epistemological 
requirement is consistently observed and the demand for justification (as a result) 
becomes systematic and not merely contextualist” (124). 
Here it is not clear that Brink has thoroughly avoided the regress argument, 
though he has given us a deflationary explanation for why we might initially lean toward 
an account of justification that preserves linearity.  Brink’s argument here involves 
pointing out that we have a bias in favor of linear accounts of justification, but the 
presence of such a bias does not prove that justification can be non-linear.  What the 
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coherentist needs is an account which shows that non-linear (circular) justification need 
not be vicious.   
Keith Lehrer provides one way of doing this.  He claims that one should only 
consider a belief justified if one also believes that the first belief “is a trustworthy guide 
to truth” (Lehrer 2000, 137-138).  Of course, we might see a regress here: I believe that 
the first belief is a trustworthy guide to truth, but why do I believe this second belief is 
the same?  This amounts to applying the epistemological requirement.  Lehrer avoids the 
regress by claiming that we can fall back on the following belief: “I am trustworthy 
(worthy of my own trust) in what I accept with the objective of accepting something just 
in case it is true” (ibid.).3  Of course, we can (and if we are after systematic justification, 
we must) ask why this belief is itself justified.  But Lehrer believes that it is justified 
because of its reflexive nature.  If I believe that I am trustworthy, then that 
trustworthiness reinforces the belief that I am trustworthy (Lehrer 2000, 142).  This 
position is obviously circular, and Lehrer admits as much.  But he claims that it is not 
viciously circular: 
If we have a principle that explains why it is reasonable to accept what we do, it 
is a virtue rather than a vice that it should at the same time explain why it is 
reasonable to accept the principle itself.  The other alternative is that the principle 
should be a kind of unexplained explainer. (Lehrer 2000, 143) 
 
Appealing to this kind of reflexive belief gives us a principled way to avoid the charge 
of circular reasoning, and I contend that this response (though quirky) stops the regress 
argument in its tracks.  In fact, we will see that the regress argument is certainly not the 
strongest argument against coherentism.  
                                               
3 Here I will not get into the technical difference between “accepting” a belief and considering it justified. 
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The second criticism of coherentism is commonly referred to as the isolation 
objection.  It is often put metaphorically: coherentism cannot provide the “contact with 
reality” necessary to be a good theory of justification.  Coherentism holds that beliefs are 
justified insofar as they are held as part of a coherent system, but this says nothing about 
whether such beliefs are held as a result of experience.  The fact that coherentism 
requires all beliefs to be inferentially justified seems to be a problem, because beliefs 
based on experience (“experiential beliefs”) do not seem to be held inferentially. 
Laurence BonJour provides us with one possible response: he distinguishes two 
different senses of the word “inferentially.”  First, we may use this word to describe how 
we arrive at a given belief.  Second, we may also use this word to explain how a belief is 
justified.  This distinction is important, because evidence from our senses is generally 
considered to be non-inferential.  BonJour then goes on to explain that the coherentist 
can easily admit that certain experiential beliefs are arrived at non-inferentially, but 
justified inferentially.  He argues that the origin of a belief (how we arrive at it) is simply 
not relevant to whether this belief is justified (BonJour 1985, 113).   
BonJour’s point seems intuitively plausible, for denying it would seem to 
constitute an instance of the genetic fallacy.  We should be careful in saying it is 
irrelevant, however.  Take the following example: suppose that Nazi scientists were the 
first to see (in experiment) that rockets with a particular type of fuel traveled the longest 
distance.  It is obviously fallacious to assert that we have no reason to believe what these 
scientists discovered because they were Nazis.  But it is of course right to think that the 
justification of this belief might be affected by the conditions which surround its origin.  
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Perhaps the Nazi scientists in question were under a great deal of political pressure to 
produce a long distance rocket, and so inflated their measured flight distances.  If we 
have reason to believe this, we have reason to doubt their discovery. 
Analogously, the coherentist should admit that the circumstances surrounding the 
origin of a belief may affect the plausibility of that belief.  But this does not commit him 
to saying that experiential beliefs, arrived at non-inferentially, must also be justified non-
inferentially.  Rather, it gives him a good reason to think the opposite.  After all, it is 
typically the foundationalist who thinks that experience gives us self-justifying, non-
inferential belief.  Rather, the coherentist can hold that, “observational belief always 
depends on the general knowledge that beliefs of [a] specific kind are nomologically 
reliable indicators of the actual presence of the sort of factual situation whose existence 
they assert” (BonJour 1985, 116).  This general knowledge might be cashed out as a 
conjunctive proposition like “I accurately perceive things in quiet, well-lit rooms and I 
am not colorblind and I accurately perceive things when I am not sleepy…”    
Of course, such a general body of knowledge is only considered knowledge by a 
person because it is (on the standard account of knowledge) true justified belief.4  And 
this general belief is itself justified by its coherent fit with the rest of the system.  In this 
way, the coherentist can give an account of how non-inferential, observational belief 
plays a part in one’s system of belief. 
The third important argument against the coherentist is perhaps the most 
challenging: the MCS objection.  This objection can be raised in a number of ways; later 
                                               
4 I am of course leaving out Gettier cases, but I do not think these affect the case at hand. 
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I will consider two specifically moral MCS objections, but here I will raise the objection 
as an expansion of the isolation objection.  Remember that the isolation objection claims 
that coherentism cannot provide the intuitively necessary connection between 
justification and experience.  Because all beliefs must be justified by inference, it 
appeared that non-inferential experiential beliefs could not be justified.  Now even if we 
adopt BonJour’s solution to this problem, we are still faced with the possibility that 
someone might reject all experiential beliefs but still have a coherent system of belief 
(call such a system an “isolated system”).  This would obviously be starkly different 
from a system of belief which did allow some experiential beliefs.  And this is where the 
MCS objection arises: both of these systems would be equally justified.  The coherentist 
must thus claim, not only that we can adopt a system of beliefs which incorporates 
experiential beliefs, but that we must adopt such a system. 
BonJour can rule out some intuitively unjustified systems of belief by further 
specifying the requirements of coherence.  To this end, he proposes five conditions: 
(1) A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically consistent. 
(2) A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic 
consistency. 
(3) The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of 
inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in 
proportion to the number and strength of such connections. 
(4) The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which it is 
divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to each 
other by inferential connections. 
(5) The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the 
presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system. 
(BonJour 1985, 95-99) 
 
The concept of “anomaly” at work in (5) is “a fact or event…which is claimed to 
obtain by one or more of the beliefs in a system…but which is incapable of being 
 25 
explained…by appeal to the other beliefs in the system” (BonJour 1985, 99).  BonJour 
appeals to a common Hempelian account of scientific explanation, in which “particular 
facts are explained by appeal to other facts and general laws from which a statement of 
the explanandum fact may be deductively or probabilistically inferred” (ibid., 98).  On 
this view, a system of beliefs which includes a number of anomalies (which cannot be 
explained in a Hempelian fashion) is less coherent than a system which includes fewer 
anomalies.  We can thus see that BonJour’s account is far more than a mere matter of 
holding a system of beliefs which is coherent (where coherence is itself an unanalyzed 
concept).  It is rather a detailed view which incorporates a specific concept of 
explanation.   
Unfortunately, while these conditions spell out the specific conditions of 
coherence, they do not on their own rule out an isolated system.  This is because one 
could imagine an isolated system where many different beliefs played an inferential role 
in other beliefs, where there were no relatively unconnected subsystems, and there were 
no unexplained anomalies, but where experiential beliefs are still banished.  Such a 
system would certainly have to be somewhat fanciful, but if it is just as justified as a 
serious, commonsense system, this is still a problem.   
BonJour believes that we can respond to this type of objection, but only by 
introducing what he calls the observation requirement (OR): “a cognitive system … 
must contain laws attributing a high degree of reliability to a reasonable variety of 
cognitively spontaneous [experiential] beliefs” (BonJour 1985, 141).  This requirement 
would independently rule out an isolated system.   
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I do not think that adding this requirement will do the trick.  This is because if we 
want systematic justification, there is nothing preventing us from asking what justifies 
the OR in the first place.  If the OR is only justified insofar as it is held as a coherent 
system (perhaps in accordance with BonJour’s five conditions), it seems difficult to see 
why someone who holds an isolated system would accept it.  Here BonJour has two 
options: he could either accept that some justified isolated systems do not include the 
OR, or he could assert that the OR has some special status among other beliefs.  Neither 
option looks acceptable to a coherentist.  What we need here is a way to incorporate the 
OR into any justified coherent system without making the OR itself a foundational 
belief.   
I think this problem can be overcome, and that we need not look to 
foundationalism for an answer as to how we might preclude an isolated system.  In 
discussing the observation requirement, BonJour hints at one possible avenue for this 
kind of account: one must not only have a coherent system of belief, but be able to 
explain why that system is coherent (BonJour 1985, 98-100).  As mentioned before, 
BonJour relies on a standard Hempelian account of explanation.  I propose that with a 
better account of explanation, we can solve this version of the MCS objection without 
modifying BonJour’s conditions or accepting foundationalism. 
2.6 Kitcher: Explanation as Unification 
In his article “Explanatory Unification,” Philip Kitcher provides an account of 
scientific explanation which is both thoroughly compatible with coherentism and which 
will allow us to avoid the observation requirement.  First he points to what he calls the 
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“official view,” which is the standard Hempelian account of explanation.  On this view, 
a theory is explanatorily relevant when “the explanatory information adduced affords 
good grounds for believing that the phenomenon to be explained did, or does, indeed 
occur” (Hempel 1991, 318).  What constitutes good grounds for believing that a 
phenomenon occurred is a deductive-nomological or inductive-statistical argument, 
where the former invokes general scientific laws and auxiliary facts to logically deduce 
the predicted result, and the latter invokes statistical laws (along with auxiliary facts) to 
provide a high probability that the predicted result will occur.  An event is explained, 
according to Hempel, when we can provide a good argument for its occurrence.   
Kitcher believes that lurking behind this view is another, unofficial view, which 
Hempel himself expressed: “What scientific explanation, especially theoretical 
explanation, aims at is not an intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but 
an objective kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the 
phenomena as manifestations of common, underlying structures and processes that 
conform to specific, testable, basic principles” (Kitcher 1991, 330).  Kitcher believes 
that we can understand explanation as unification itself. 
To get at how this might be so, Kitcher explains how we draw up explanatory 
arguments in the first place.  In his account, we have a set of arguments available for 
explanatory purposes (what he calls an “explanatory store”) (Kitcher 1991, 332).  The 
crucial feature of his account is that he is attempting to specify “conditions which must 
be met by the explanatory store” so as to rule out explanatory stores which are merely 
“unrelated individual arguments which can be used in individual acts of explanation” 
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(ibid.).  More formally, he calls our explanatory store E, and the set of accepted 
sentences (describing phenomena) K.  The task for the unificationist is to explain the 
relation E(K) (“the explanatory store over K”) which is “the set of arguments acceptable 
as the basis for acts of explanation by those whose beliefs are exactly the members of K” 
(Kitcher 1991, 332). 
Kitcher believes that we can define good conditions for E(K) by attending to the 
argument patterns employed in E.  When a theory “provides one (or more generally, a 
few) pattern(s) of argument which can be used in the derivation of a large number of 
sentences which we accept,” that theory is unified (and thus explanatory).  As an 
example of this kind of argument pattern, Kitcher points to Darwin, who explained the 
features of organisms by natural selection.  Darwin’s account is highly explanatory 
because the argument pattern for all species is the same: for any organism O and any 
given characteristic x (anatomical, behavioral, etc.) of O, O will have x iff x improves the 
fitness F of O.  To flesh out this example, suppose the set K of sentences describing 
observed phenomena includes (among other things) two sentences: “Giraffes have long 
necks” and “Male frogs croak loudly to attract mates.”  Darwin’s account is explanatory 
because both of these sentences are explained with one argument pattern: the giraffe has 
a long neck because those giraffes with longer necks had greater fitness, and male frogs 
croak loudly because the louder the frog was, the more likely it was to attract a mate, 
also increasing its fitness.  This explanation is obviously better than (for instance) an 
explanation in which the loudness of male frogs’ croaks is explained by their need to 
exercise their throats and the giraffes’ long necks are explained by their ancestors’ neck-
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stretching.  Of course, Darwin’s explanation also commits him to applying the argument 
pattern the same way in all relevantly similar cases.  So, given that (say) complex organs 
are a characteristic of many organisms, Darwin must explain how complex organs 
improve the fitness of an organism, and be able to show how such organs could have 
developed via incremental changes (across many generations) from simple to more 
complex organs (Kitcher 1991, 334). 
To give us a better grasp of what an argument pattern is, Kitcher further 
formalizes the concept.  An argument pattern “is a triple consisting of a schematic 
argument, a set of sets of filling instructions containing one set of filling instructions for 
each term of the schematic argument, and a classification for the schematic argument” 
(Kitcher 1991, 335).  First, a schematic argument is one where the non-logical terms of 
an argument have been replaced with dummy letters.  Second, the filling instructions are 
directions on how to replace each dummy letter with a non-logical term which occurs in 
a particular sentence of our set of accepted sentences K.  Finally, a classification is “a set 
of sentences which describe the inferential characteristics of the schematic argument” 
(ibid.).  The classification tells us “which terms in the sequence are to be regarded as 
premises, which are to be inferred from which, what rules of inference are to be used, 
and so forth” (ibid.). 
Furthermore, there are a number of conditions which Kitcher believes must 
obtain for a sequence of sentences to constitute an argument pattern: 
(i) The sequence has the same number of terms as the schematic argument of 
the general argument pattern. 
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(ii) Each sentence in the sequence is obtained from the corresponding 
schematic sentence in accordance with the appropriate set of filling 
instructions. 
(iii) It is possible to construct a chain of reasoning which assigns to each 
sentence the status accorded to the corresponding schematic sentence by 
the classification. (Kitcher 1991, 335). 
 
Returning to the previous example, we can see more clearly how Darwin’s 
argument pattern would be formalized by Kitcher.  Any sequence of sentences which we 
wish to call an evolutionary explanation must meet conditions (i)-(iii).  Moreover, it 
must be modeled on a schematic argument which I give below.  Note that the argument 
pattern adduced below is given meaning by the filling instructions; without them, it is 
trivial: 
(1) F = Na/Nb. 
(2) Ot ↔ F > 1. 
(3) ~Ot ↔ F < 1. 
(4) F > 1. 
(5) Ot. 
This schematic is the general form of the argument, but what truly does the work here 
are the filling instructions.5  They tell us that O is to be replaced by a species of 
organism, t is to be replaced by a characteristic of that organism, F is to be replaced by 
the organism’s absolute fitness.  They further tell us that Na is to be replaced by the 
number of organisms with a given genotype after a selection, and Nb is to be replaced by 
the number of organisms of a given genotype before a selection.  The classification tells 
us that O ranges over t with the one-place relation “has” (organism O has characteristic 
                                               
5 See Kitcher (1991) for another example of schematic arguments with filling instructions. 
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x), and that (1)-(4) are to be used as premises while (5) is to be used as a conclusion.  Of 
course, this example schematic argument is far too simplistic to actually model an 
evolutionary argument, partially because absolute fitness is not always easy to measure 
(meaning it may not cleanly match up with our set of accepted sentences K). Moreover, 
it does not cleanly distinguish between those characteristics of an organism which lend 
toward its increased fitness and those traits which are merely “along for the ride” but do 
not increase its fitness.  My aim here is not to provide a precisely accurate Darwinian 
schematic argument, but to give a good example of a schematic argument in the first 
place.  
 While having a small number of argument patterns does give a theory more 
unified power, this is not the only requirement.  The argument patterns must also be 
stringent.  The stringency requirement is formed by “(1) the conditions on the 
substitution of expressions for dummy letters, jointly imposed by the presence of non-
logical expressions in the pattern and by the filling instructions; and, (2) the conditions 
on the logical structure, imposed by the classification” (Kitcher 1991, 336).  Thus an 
argument pattern which failed to provide detailed conditions on either count would not 
be considered stringent.  This means that a theory which employs very few argument 
patterns but has either (A) very lax conditions for the substitution of dummy letters or 
(B) very lax conditions on the logical structure would fail to be unified.  Taken together, 
the number and stringency of argument patterns are considered the two conditions which 
measure a theory’s explanatory power. 
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 Returning once again to our example, we can see that these two conditions are 
fairly good at capturing our intuitive notion of explanatory power.  Consider the 
previously mentioned alternative to the evolutionary explanation, which has different 
explanations for why male frogs croak loudly and giraffes have long necks.  The kind of 
argument pattern instantiated by the first explanation might be the following: 
(1) Ot → Ol. 
(2) ~Ot→ ~Ol. 
(3) Ot. 
(4) Ol. 
In this case, the filling instructions would specify that t is the characteristic of 
needing to exercise one’s throat, l is the characteristic of croaking loudly, and O is any 
organism which is a frog.  The classification tells us that O is a one-place relation 
(“has”) ranging over t and l and that (1)-(3) are to be used as premises and (4) is to be 
used as a conclusion following from these premises. 
It is easy to see that the argument pattern instantiated by the second explanation 
about the long necks of giraffes will be somewhat different.  Though the logical structure 
will remain the same, the filling instructions and classification will be significantly 
different: t and l will be “needing to stretch one’s neck” and “having a long neck”, and O 
will refer to any organism that is a giraffe (instead of a frog).  Kitcher’s point should be 
quite obvious here: if we are faced with one explanation for a number of phenomena or 
many explanations for many phenomena, we should prefer the one explanation.  
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2.7 Unificationist Epistemology 
I contend that we can use Kitcher’s unificationist account of explanation to 
generate a stricter approach to coherentism which is not vulnerable to the MCS objection 
adduced above.  Before I proceed, a few quick notes are in order.  First, recall that an 
isolated system is one where experiential beliefs are entirely excluded.  Here it is 
important to make the point that even someone who holds an isolated system will have 
observational input.  What makes such a system isolated is not that the person does not 
hear, see, or feel anything, but that she does not think that any of these experiences 
justify her in believing the content of that her senses deliver to her.  She rules out 
experiential beliefs not on the basis of a lack of observational input, but on the basis of 
skepticism about her perceptions.   
Second, as I will be deploying Kitcher’s work for epistemological ends, it is 
necessary that we see the set of accepted sentences K as containing sentences not only 
about things in the world, but also sentences about one’s beliefs about things in the 
world, and even sentences about one’s beliefs about one’s beliefs about things in the 
world.  On this reading, K would include sentences like “humans have ten toes” and 
sentences like “I believe humans have ten toes” and “I believe that I believe that humans 
have ten toes.”  I do not think this reading poses a problem for Kitcher’s account, though 
it does depart significantly from its original aims.  From here, the strategy will be to ask 
how the hypothetical proponent of an isolated system would explain her entire set of 
accepted sentences K.  If an isolated system cannot explain its set of accepted sentences 
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(including the statements describing its beliefs) as well as a non-isolated system, this 
provides a good means of calling the isolated system less justified.   
With these points in mind, I will consider two different types of isolated systems 
in turn: many-pattern and single-pattern isolated systems.  Our account of coherentism 
must be able to deal with both kinds of isolated systems if it is to avoid the MCS 
objection.  A many-pattern isolated system would involve many different argument 
patterns which serve to explain why different experiential beliefs are rejected.  For 
instance, someone could hold that she does not accept what she sees because she 
believes that there are small gnomes manipulating her optic nerve, and does not accept 
what she tastes because her saliva has been chemically modified, etc.  In this case, her 
higher-order belief that experiential beliefs should be rejected is really based on a 
number of different argument patterns with (presumably) different filling instructions 
and classifications.  It is easy to see that when compared with the standard belief about 
the role of experiential beliefs, this kind of isolated system would not be as unified.  That 
is, someone who holds the (presumably reasonable) belief that he is a good detector of 
medium-sized dry goods in good lighting can explain his experiential beliefs using just 
one general argument pattern: 
(1)  ∀y(By)→ ∀x(Cx). 
(2) ∀y(~By)→ x(~Cx). 
(3) ∀y(By). 
(4) ∀x(Cx). 
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In this argument pattern, the filling instructions would tell us that y is to be 
replaced by any statement about an experiential belief and x is to be replaced by any 
statement about a second-order belief whose content endorses y.  Moreover, the 
instructions would tell us that B is a one-place relation (“is formed under good epistemic 
conditions”: decent lighting, sobriety, etc.) ranging over y, and C is a one-place relation 
(“is epistemically warranted”) ranging over x.  The classification, once again, tells us 
that (1)-(3) are to be used as premises and (4) as a conclusion.  Not only does this system 
rely on just one argument pattern to explain why it accepts experiential beliefs, this 
argument pattern is stringent.  Its filling conditions do not let just any statement in; more 
specifically, they exclude statements about beliefs which are not formed under good 
epistemic conditions. 
Now, a system of beliefs which instantiates this argument pattern will obviously 
be more unified than the aforementioned many-pattern isolated system which 
instantiates many different argument patterns with many different filling instructions and 
classifications.  As such, this case is relatively easy.  However, this is not the end of the 
story, as there is a second kind of isolated system which we must dispense with: the 
single-pattern isolated system.   
This kind of isolated system would reject experiential beliefs using a single 
argument pattern.  We might represent this possibility by imagining someone who 
believes in the existence of a Cartesian evil demon: she has the higher-order belief that 
her experiential beliefs have been thoroughly warped by the demon’s influence.  As a 
result, she rejects all of her experiential beliefs. 
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Kitcher considers a similar problem he calls “spurious unification.”  We might 
imagine this kind of isolated system as a kind of argument pattern which unifies all of 
one’s beliefs by “completely deriving all of them using arguments which instantiate one 
pattern” (Kitcher 1991, 342).  This seems like a reasonable construal of the isolated 
system in question because every belief such a person would have is explained by the 
evil demon’s tampering.  This kind of argument pattern might look like the following: 
(1) ∀x(Dx). 
(2) ∃y(~Dy). 
The filling instructions for this pattern would specify that x refers to all but one accepted 
sentence in K, D is a one-place relation (“is an illusion caused by the evil demon”) 
ranging over x, and y is one accepted sentence which states: “the evil demon exists.”  
(We should note that because we are here construing K as including statements about 
beliefs, without (2) we would see the paradoxical consequence that the belief “the evil 
demon exists” is itself an illusion caused by the evil demon.)  This kind of isolated 
system appears to explain all of its accepted sentences with a single argument pattern.   
 Kitcher has a ready reply about such a universal argument patterns: “they fail 
dismally when judged by the criterion of stringency” (Kitcher 1991, 342).  Stringency, 
again, is a combination of two factors: “(1) the conditions on the substitution of 
expressions for dummy letters…[and] (2) the conditions on the logical structure” 
(Kitcher 336).  It seems clear that the argument pattern above fails on the first count; it is 
“very lax in allowing any vocabulary whatever to appear in the place of” x (Kitcher 
1991, 342).  As in our Darwinian example, the logical form of an argument schematic is 
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often trivial or uninteresting; the filling instructions do most of the work in defining the 
argument pattern.  For this reason, the filling instructions must be quite specific.  Non-
stringent argument patterns allow far too broad a range of objects to occupy places in the 
non-logical vocabulary.  Because such an argument pattern is not stringent enough, it is 
not unified, and because it is not unified, it is not explanatory.   
 There is another important note to be made about this kind of argument pattern.  
Though it purports to explain all of one’s beliefs by calling them illusions created by the 
evil demon, it is unclear exactly how the belief in the evil demon itself could be 
explained.  This becomes especially problematic when one considers the fact that the 
argument pattern above rejects all beliefs but the one which states that the evil demon 
exists.  As a result, there is no clear argument pattern left which one might point to in 
explaining one’s belief in the evil demon. 
 Consider the non-isolated system’s favored argument pattern (mentioned above).  
This argument pattern explains one’s experiential beliefs with reference to the epistemic 
conditions under which those beliefs are formed.  It is easy to see that the non-isolated 
system would have to explain another (second-order) belief (B) about the connection 
between the set of epistemic conditions asserted about x and the epistemic warrant 
assigned to them in y.  (Construe B as the following: “an experiential belief formed 
under good epistemic conditions is a warranted belief”).  But this is not a problem for the 
non-isolated system, because this belief may be explained by any number of other 
beliefs that the non-isolated system has at its disposal.  Avoiding a regress, we might 
even say that this iterative process of explanation could eventually bottom out in 
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something like Lehrer’s reflexive belief: “I am trustworthy (worthy of my own trust) in 
what I accept with the objective of accepting something just in case it is true” (Lehrer 
2000, 137-138).  And here we need only assert that just as this belief can provide 
warrant for itself, it can ultimately explain itself as well.  This route of explanation is not 
available to the single-pattern isolated system because such a system discounts all beliefs 
as illusions created by the evil demon, and so, again, has no resources with which to 
explain the belief in the evil demon. 
 There is another potential route for the proponent of an isolated system, and this 
represents a middle-way between the many-pattern and single-pattern system.  She may 
do something analogous to “artificially introduc[ing] restrictions on the pattern to make 
it more stringent” (Kitcher 1991, 342).  In our case, this means she might turn to the very 
same argument pattern which the non-isolated system employs, but change the filling 
instructions.  This pattern would (again) look like this: 
(1) ∀y(By)→ ∀x(Cx). 
(2) ∀y(~By)→ x(~Cx). 
(3) ∀y(By). 
(4) ∀x(Cx). 
The filling instructions she would introduce might specify that y is to be replaced by any 
statement about an experiential belief and x is to be replaced by any statement about a 
second-order belief whose content rejects y.  The instructions would further tell us that B 
is a one-place relation (“is formed under ‘good’ epistemic conditions”) ranging over y, 
and C is a one-place relation (“is epistemically unwarranted”) ranging over x.  This kind 
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of argument pattern appears to be stringent, and could be used to explain just as many 
statements about experiential beliefs as the similar argument pattern employed by 
someone who holds a non-isolated system. 
 This strategy runs into a problem similar to the one encountered earlier: what 
explains one’s second-order belief (B`) about the connection between the set of 
epistemic conditions asserted about x and the lack of epistemic warrant asserted about 
them in y?  (The content of B` would be: “an experiential belief formed under ‘good’ 
epistemic conditions is an unwarranted belief”).  If such a belief is explained with 
reference to some other higher-order belief which denies the epistemic warrant of beliefs 
generally, then an isolated system which uses this argument pattern is in just as bad a 
shape as the single-pattern system mentioned earlier.  Alternatively, this system might 
avoid such a general belief and propose a higher-order belief (B``) that only targets B`.  
But then we run into a regress, for what justifies B``?  An isolated system cannot explain 
itself with reference to a version of Lehrer’s reflexive belief, because a belief which 
stated: “I am not trustworthy (worthy of my own trust) in what I accept with the 
objective of accepting something just in case it is true” would not be self-explaining in 
the same way.   
It appears that there is no good argument pattern which makes an isolated system 
as good at explaining its own coherence as a non-isolated system.  Because at least some 
non-isolated systems do explain why they are coherent, I think we can build a 
requirement which rules out isolated systems without relying on the observation 
requirement.  This can come in the form of a sixth condition on the coherence of a 
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system (in addition to the five that BonJour mentions): (6) The coherence of a system of 
beliefs is increased to the extent that it can provide a explanation for why it is coherent, 
with more unified systems being more explanatory and less unified systems being less 
explanatory.  (Construe “unified,” a la Kitcher, as some ideal combination of stringency 
and few argument patterns). 
With this condition, we can see that there is at least a plausible case to be made 
that the MCS objection can be overcome without the use of the (problematic) 
observation requirement.  We should not be overly hasty: there may be ways of 
conceiving of an isolated system which are not preempted by this sixth condition.  But I 
can think of none which are not either a many-pattern or single-pattern isolated system 
(or something in between).  If there are indeed none, we will have a good reason for 
thinking that the MCS objection fails.  
There is one last objection that we must anticipate, and it relates to the whole 
strategy that both BonJour and I are attempting: if I am designing an account of 
coherentism which excludes all cases of isolated systems, is this not merely an ad hoc 
addition to the concept of coherence?  To this I can only remind the reader of the 
dialectic at work here.  Remember that the MCS objection operates by pointing to an 
intuitively unjustified system and claiming that coherentism licenses it.  Because such a 
system could not possibly be justified, the argument claims that coherentism is false.  
The argument is thus a reductio ad absurdum.  But if we suitably adjust our account of 
coherence so that it precludes these kinds of systems, the reductio does not go through.  
It would certainly be a problem to simply stipulate that isolated systems are not justified, 
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as such a move would simply beg the question in favor of coherentism.  But that is not 
what we have done here.  Rather, I have provided an account of coherentism which both 
excludes isolated systems and uses an account of explanation which is independently 
plausible (see Kitcher (1991) for the many independent virtues of this account of 
explanation). 
2.8 Section Conclusion 
Let us return to the implications of these arguments for Brink’s moral realism.  
As we have seen, there is good reason to believe that foundationalism has serious 
problems.  It is not clear that self-justifying beliefs exist.  Furthermore, when combined 
with moral realism, foundationalism runs the risk of simply justifying the preexisting 
beliefs of one’s upbringing and culture.  It is not clear that even a careful investigation 
will succeed in arriving at self-evident moral beliefs, and it is furthermore not obvious 
that such beliefs need no justification.  Out of the three criticisms of coherentism, the 
first two are fairly easily dealt with.  Though coherentism requires circular justification, 
such justification is not viciously circular.  Additionally, coherentism is compatible with 
input from the external world because it can differentiate the causal source of a belief 
from the justification of that same belief.  The MCS objection is a much more difficult 
problem, and one that I believe deserves a great deal more space.  I believe that we can 
avoid the non-moral MCS objection above by including an explanatory requirement in 
coherentism.  However, I do not think that all species of the MCS objection are so easily 
dealt with.  In the coming section I will propose two additional MCS objections that 
specifically arise for moral systems of belief. 
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3. INTRANSIGENCE: TWO NEW MCS OBJECTIONS  
 In this section I will draw from the work of Jonathan Haidt and Richard Lazarus 
in sketching a cognitivist critique of coherentist moral realism.  In the first subsection, I 
argue against constitutive cognitivism and defend a form of etiological cognitivism that 
claims that intuitive moral judgments cause moral emotions.  In the second subsection, I 
will review the evidence for the social intuitionist model of moral decision-making and 
argue that when combined with the CAD triad hypothesis, it implies that reasoned moral 
judgments are caused by intuitive moral judgments.  In subsection three, I will argue that 
this view presents two problems for coherentism: “the problem of intransigence” and the 
“limited problem of intransigence.”  These problems represent two new versions of the 
MCS objection.  Finally, in subsection four I analyze what these objections mean for 
Brink’s coherentist moral realism and conclude that there is as yet no adequate response 
to such objections.  
3.1 Constitutive or Etiological Cognitivism? 
 Here I will consider two possibilities for the relationship between judgments and 
emotions: 
Constitutive Cognitivism: judgments constitute emotional states. 
Etiological Cognitivism: judgments cause emotional states.6 
This thesis takes up etiological cognitivism for two main reasons.  First, we have good 
and independent reasons for believing it to be the case.  Second, it is important to the 
critique I develop later that we have good reasons to believe etiological cognitivism to 
                                               
6 See Scarantino (2010) for more about these distinctions. 
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be true.  If it were not, we would risk getting mired in the seemingly endless debate over 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism.  I believe this debate can be circumvented with the 
right understanding of the relationship between judgments and emotions. 
 The main target of my critique of constitutive cognitivism is Martha Nussbaum, 
who holds that “emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of 
the object’s salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or 
evaluation” (Nussbaum 2001, 23).7  Here it is important to note that Nussbaum has a 
fairly liberal conception of what judgment is.  Judgment is not necessarily “the presence 
of elaborate calculation, of computation, or even of reflexive self-awareness” (ibid.). 
 Nussbaum thinks that there are good reasons for identifying emotions with a 
species of judgment.  For one, most emotions, like judgments, appear to have 
intentionality.  They are about their object.  To elaborate on this, we should turn to the 
work of Anthony Kenny, who distinguishes two senses of the word “object”: material 
and formal.  As he puts it, “Anything which can be [φed] is a material object of φing,” 
while “[t]he formal object φing is the object under that description which must apply to 
it if it is to be possible to φ it” (Kenny 2003, 132).  Nussbaum holds that the object of an 
emotion is what that emotion allows one to perceive.  Using Kenny’s language of formal 
objects, emotions (according to Nussbaum) perceive their material objects.  Thus when 
speaking about the death of her mother, Nussbaum says that, “my fear perceived my 
mother both as tremendously important and as threatened” (emphasis added) (Nussbaum 
                                               
7 Throughout this paper I will use the words “cognitive appraisal” and “judgment” interchangeably.  The 
former appears to be preferred by psychologists in order to be very specific about what they mean; 
“judgment” may contain too much philosophical baggage for empirical work.  Though I use the terms 
interchangeably, I intend for the meaning of “judgment” to simply be “cognitive appraisal” and nothing 
else. 
 44 
2001, 27).  Her mother’s precarious condition is the material object of Nussbaum’s fear 
simply because it can be feared.  And her mother’s condition constitutes a material 
instantiation of the formal object of fear itself, which is simply “danger” (or perhaps “a 
danger of loss or harm”).   
In this framework, it is also easy to see that different emotions can embody 
different kinds of value judgments about their objects.  Even when the object stays the 
same, one’s emotions toward an object might change over time as one’s perceptions 
about the object change.  For instance, someone who fears spiders might undergo 
systematic desensitization therapy to get rid of this fear.  If the therapy is successful, she 
would see the same object (a spider) with different emotions after the therapy (perhaps 
even admiration!).  What is important here for Nussbaum’s view is that even though our 
emotions about an object may change, those emotions will always constitute some 
judgment about that object.   
Moreover, Nussbaum thinks that having certain beliefs is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for having certain emotions (Nussbaum 2001, 34).  Nussbaum is 
thus committed to the position that one’s value judgment about an object cannot change 
without an accompanying change in one’s emotions toward the object, and vice versa.   
The claim that certain judgments are necessary for certain emotions seems 
difficult to defend.  This is because it opens her position up to a fairly obvious 
counterexample: suppose a man, John, grew up in a conservative household and attended 
a church which instilled in him a deep disgust for homosexuals, as well as the judgment 
that being homosexual is immoral. If John later comes to think that his original judgment 
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about homosexuality is wrong, it appears as though Nussbaum is committed to the view 
that his disgust must also change.  Yet it is easy to imagine that John might still be 
disgusted by homosexuals, though he no longer believes such an emotion is justified.  
How might Nussbaum explain situations where a person’s emotions do not line up with 
his judgment? 
 Nussbaum’s view appears to be that John would simply hold two contradictory 
judgments.  One judgment (which is constituted by his disgust toward homosexuals) 
simply contradicts another more recent (and less emotional) judgment (Nussbaum 2001, 
36).  Here, though, Nussbaum’s claim that judgments are sufficient for emotions 
presents another difficulty.  For if John has a more recent (positive) judgment toward 
homosexuals, should he not have an emotion which corresponds with that judgment?  
After all, certain judgments are supposed to be sufficient for certain emotions. 
 Nussbaum may be able to respond in one of two ways.  First, she might claim 
that John’s more recent judgment about homosexuals does involve an emotion (perhaps 
respect).  This would amount to saying that John is simply emotionally conflicted.  He 
has two different, conflicting emotions about homosexuals, neither of which has gained 
the upper hand.  Second, Nussbaum might claim that John’s more recent judgment is a 
simple cognitive judgment, and does not have a corresponding emotion.  This is allowed 
by her account, because while certain judgments are sufficient for certain emotions, it 
does not rule out the possibility that some judgments have no corresponding emotion 
(judgments about pedestrian facts like “when on the Washington, DC Metro escalators, I 
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should stand on the right and pass on the left” seem to plausibly have no corresponding 
emotion, for instance). 
 It is not clear that either of these responses match our intuitions about value 
judgments.  First, there seems to be something important about what a person explicitly 
avows about his beliefs.  If when asked, John says that he no longer believes that 
homosexuals are immoral, it seems strange to insist that John really also has the opposite 
belief if he admits that he still finds homosexuals disgusting.  Surely the best access 
(from our perspective) to what he thinks he believes is what he avows, and in this case, 
he explicitly disavows the belief that Nussbaum would want to attribute to him.   
Of course, Nussbaum cannot simply insist that John has a negative belief toward 
homosexuals because it is a result of her theory, because this would be begging the 
question.  She might instead say that we are able to infer what John believes from his 
actions.  Perhaps John goes out of his way to avoid a gay pride parade; this might allow 
us to infer that he thinks that homosexuals are immoral.  But is this explanation for his 
behavior (which he explicitly disavows) any more reasonable than the alternative 
explanation (which he explicitly avows), namely, that he is merely disgusted by 
homosexuals but does not have a belief that they are immoral?  Apart from question-
begging, there seems to be no independent reason for preferring this explanation of his 
behavior.  If anything, in such cases it seems reasonable to believe what a person 
explicitly avows about his beliefs.  
 This is not the only potential problem for Nussbaum’s theory of emotions. In 
fact, there is a far more general criticism available.  Andrea Scarantino has argued that 
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constitutive cognitivism suffers from what he calls the “Problem of Multiple 
Components”: for any given emotion, there are various components that we associate 
with the emotion.  Scarantino gives the example of anger: 
[W]e can distinguish in the complex phenomenon that is anger several 
parts: an evaluative component (e.g., evaluating being denied tenure as a slight), 
a physiological component (e.g., increased heart rate and blood pressure), a 
phenomenological component (e.g., an unpleasant feeling), an expressive 
component (e.g., fixed stare, loud voice, erected body), a physical action 
component (e.g., insulting, storming out of the room), and a mental action 
component (e.g., focusing attention, planning an appeal, remembering previous 
slights). (Scarantino 2010, 748) 
 
Scarantino believes that such a group of heterogeneous components forces the 
constitutive cognitivist into a dilemma.  One possibility is that her theory would be 
“falsified on a grand scale” because it fails to explain instances of fear which do not 
involve conscious awareness, or because it cannot “capture all nonevaluative 
components of emotions” like physiological changes (Scarantino 2010, 749). 
 There is one possible response: the constitutive cognitivist could simply dig in 
her heels and say that when she speaks about judgment, she means all of these different 
components.  In this case, her use of the word “judgment” is simply a placeholder for 
this heterogeneous group.  But Scarantino thinks this will not do for two reasons.  First, 
such a solution simply renders the thesis of constitutive cognitivism trivially true.  Of 
course judgments are emotions if by “judgment” we just mean all of the changes an 
emotion elicits in an organism.  Such a thesis may be true, but will not explain anything.  
Second, such a thesis would no longer be falsifiable.  There seems to be no empirical 
evidence which would disprove such an identification of judgment with emotion 
(Scarantino 2010, 749). 
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 Scarantino thinks the “digging in her heels” move is quite common in 
constitutive cognitivist literature, and he calls it the “Elastic Strategy.”  He defines the 
move somewhat formally: 
The anti-cognitivist brings up a property P that emotions have … and judgments 
conservatively understood lack, or a property Q that judgments conservatively 
understood have … and emotions lack. On this basis, the anti-cognitivist 
concludes that emotions are not judgments, and that cognitivism is therefore 
falsified as a general theory of emotions. The Elastic Strategy consists of arguing 
that, under a liberal understanding of judgment, judgments also have property P 
… or lack property Q.  (Scarantino 2010, 745). 
 
Scarantino thinks that constitutive cognitivism will have to employ such a strategy 
against basically every counterexample provided by anti-cognitivists.  No matter what 
the counterexample, this move will lead to the dilemma Scarantino posed above.  Either 
constitutive cognitivism will be falsified, or it will adapt to incorporate the 
counterexample and thus become trivially true (nonexplanatory) or unfalsifiable. 
I contend that this is a telling criticism of Nussbaum’s view.  Whatever the 
correct view of the interaction between judgments and emotions, that view must explain 
both judgments and emotions, and must not do so at the price of becoming unfalsifiable.  
There is another thesis available in the literature that promises to do precisely this: what 
Scarantino calls “etiological cognitivism.”  On this view, certain judgments are not 
themselves certain emotions.  Instead, certain judgments cause certain emotions.  Stated 
formally, this account says that “for all E, emotion E is caused by the appraisal that the 
formal object of E is instantiated (by some material object O)” (Scarantino 2010, 750). 
This kind of account is more thoroughly fleshed out by Richard Lazarus, who 
believes that each emotion is not only defined by a specific meaning, but that these 
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(cognitive) meanings are the cause of certain emotions (Lazarus 1991, 39).  Here is a 
quick sketch of the causal theory Lazarus employs: a person receives sensory input, 
(perhaps subconsciously) appraises the information generated from that sensory input.  If 
her appraisal indicates that something in the situation instantiates the core relational 
theme8 of some emotion, her appraisal will cause that emotion.    
 This is best explained with a (perhaps simplistic) example.  A woman, Carol, is 
walking out of the supermarket when a stranger bolts by and steals her purse.  Carol 
receives sensory input, which might include the physical features of the man, his jerking 
the purse out of her hand, etc.  She then appraises (judges) the information generated 
from her sensory input.  This appraisal indicates that he has stolen her purse.  From here, 
the account would say that this appraisal causes the emotion of anger.  The appraisal is 
the cause of the anger because it indicates to the agent that the situation in question (the 
man stealing her purse) instantiates the core relational theme corresponding to anger.9 
 Lazarus further breaks down the concept of appraisal at work here.  There are 
two important parts of appraisal, both of which can be found in the example above.  
There is primary appraisal, which is “directed at the establishment of the significance or 
meaning of the event to the organism” (Lazarus 2001, 23).  This part of appraisal can be 
further subdivided into three specific categories: goal-relevance, goal-congruence, and 
type-ego involvement.  Goal relevance here is “whether an encounter is viewed by a 
person as relevant to well being,” and Lazarus claims that there will be no emotion if 
                                               
8 Instead of speaking about the “formal object” of an emotion, Lazarus refers to “core relational themes.”  
As Scarantino points out, these terms are interchangeable (Scarantino, 733). 
9 Drawing on Kenny (1963), Scarantino says that the formal object of anger is “A demeaning offense 
against me and mine” (Scarantino, 733). 
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there is no goal at stake (Lazarus 2001, 55).  Goal (in)congruence is the agent’s 
determination of “whether the conditions of an encounter facilitate or thwart what the 
person wants” (Lazarus 2001, 56).  Finally, type-ego involvement includes “self or 
social esteem, moral values, ego ideals, commitment to certain meanings and ideas, the 
well-being of other persons, and life goals” (Lazarus 2001, 57).  Then there is secondary 
appraisal, which is “directed at the assessment of the ability of the organism to cope with 
the consequences of the event” (ibid.).  The features of secondary appraisal are blame, 
coping potential, and future expectancy (Lazarus 1991, 226).  Lazarus provides the 
following table for anger: 
Primary Appraisal Components 
1. If there is goal relevance, then any emotion is possible, including anger. If not, 
no emotion. 
2. If there is goal incongruence, then only negative emotions are possible, 
including anger. 
3. If the type of ego-involvement engaged is to preserve or enhance the self- or 
social-esteem aspect of one's ego-identity, then the emotion possibilities include 
anger, anxiety, and pride. 
 
Secondary Appraisal Components 
4. If there is blame, which derives from the knowledge that someone is 
accountable for the harmful actions, and they could have been controlled, then 
anger occurs. If the blame is to another, the anger is directed externally; if to 
oneself, the anger is directed internally. 
5. If coping potential favors attack as viable, then anger is facilitated. 
6. If future expectancy is positive about the environmental response to attack, 
then anger is facilitated. (ibid.) 
 
Lazarus notes that (1)-(4) are to be considered appraisal components necessary and 
sufficient for anger. 
Let us see more specifically how Lazarus would evaluate our example.  When 
Carol sees the stranger, she (1) appraises his actions as goal-relevant (he has run by her 
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and taken her purse).  She also (2) appraises his presence as goal-incongruent (what he 
has done will cost her money).  And she (3) appraises what he is doing as an offense 
against her (he has taken her purse unfairly).  These components comprise her primary 
appraisal of the situation.  Her secondary appraisal of the situation includes the next 
three components.  (4) She sees the man as blameworthy in this situation; he quite 
evidently did not steal her purse on accident.  According to Lazarus, the presence of (1)-
(4) in this example will cause anger.  He also notes that (5) and (6) can facilitate anger if 
aligned correctly.  So, for example (5) if Carol thinks she can run to catch up with the 
man, her anger will be facilitated, whereas if he is much faster than her, she may be 
more resigned.  The same is true for future expectancy (6) if she sees that a police officer 
has noticed the theft and given chase, this will facilitate her anger, whereas if she has no 
way of catching him, this will tend to make her more resigned.   
What is important about this account is that these features of primary and 
secondary appraisal are supposed to be necessary and sufficient causes of emotions.  
Though Lazarus indicates that there are different requirements for each emotion’s core 
relational theme, he believes that we can spell out these requirements.  In the case of 
anger, when there is a combination of goal relevance, goal incongruence, involvement of 
self or social esteem, and blame, anger will be produced. 
 This picture has been subject to one very important criticism: it seems unlikely 
that some emotions, such as fear, need to be so cognitively mediated.  There seems to be 
a large difference between the cat that fears and runs from my dog and my fear about 
failing to get through graduate school.  We would be more hesitant to ascribe a complex 
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cognitive appraisal to the cat’s experience than to mine, yet we would still label both 
fear.  This line of critique has been developed far more fully in Zajonc (1980). 
 There is a crucial presupposition in this criticism, however: it identifies 
“cognitive” with “conscious and well thought out.”  The etiological cognitivist, as 
Scarantino points out, can easily avoid the criticism by claiming that cognitive appraisals 
(judgments) may be relatively primitive and unconscious.  Rather than assuming that all 
emotions must be caused by a conscious process, we might rightly see cognitive 
appraisals as lying on a continuum: this would put the cat fearing my dog’s approach on 
the primitive end of the continuum and my fear of failing graduate school on the more 
sophisticated end.   
 Scarantino is somewhat skeptical of this approach, however.  This is largely 
because of what he describes as the Problem of Levels of Appraisal.  That is, if we treat 
appraisal as the cause of emotions, but admit that the same emotions can be caused by 
both sophisticated and primitive appraisals, “the class of appraisals becomes very 
heterogeneous” and this “glosses over the important differences between lower and 
higher levels of information processing in terms of speed and automaticity, neural 
pathways, evolutionary history, insulation from higher thought processes, and so on” 
(Scarantino 2010, 755).  Thus etiological cognitivism runs the risk of not being very 
explanatory. 
 I do not believe this is a particularly telling criticism of etiological cognitivism.  
Even Scarantino admits that there has been some work done on distinguishing these 
levels (he points to the work of Leventhal and Scherer (1987), van Reekum and Scherer 
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(1997), and Teasdale (1999)).  It appears as though etiological cognitivism could be 
sufficiently explanatory as long as these different levels of appraisal were mapped out in 
adequate detail.  From here I will adopt etiological cognitivism: judgments cause 
emotions, and judgments can be arrayed on a continuum going from relatively primitive 
judgments to more sophisticated, cognitively complex judgments.  In the next section I 
will point to evidence that specifically moral judgments are on the primitive end of this 
spectrum.   
3.2 The SI Model: Intuitions Are Primary 
 At this point, it is important to see where we stand.  There seem to be good 
reasons to resist the idea that judgments constitute emotions.  As Scarantino has shown 
quite convincingly, identifying emotions with cognitive appraisals is a project that fails 
to explain much about both emotions and judgments.  Moreover, the account is (for 
reasons argued previously) either trivially true or unfalsifiable.  As a result, I raised 
another possibility about the connection between emotions and judgments: judgments 
cause emotions.  In this section I will draw on the work of Jonathan Haidt to argue that 
moral judgments are typically intuitive judgments.  I will use the term “intuition” to refer 
to any given intuitive moral judgment and the term “reasoned judgment” to refer to any 
given reasoned moral judgment.  These can be seen as strict analogues of what 
Scarantino calls “primitive appraisals” and “sophisticated appraisals,” respectively, and 
are not meant to connote what philosophers have historically attributed to either term.  
As we will see in the section that follows this one, this argument causes serious 
problems for coherentist accounts of moral realism. 
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 First it is important to get clear on what exactly distinguishes intuitions from 
reasoned judgments.  First, intuition generally occurs quickly, whereas reasoning occurs 
more slowly.  Second, only the product of intuition is accessible to consciousness, 
whereas in the case of reasoning, both the product and the process are so accessible.  
Third, intuition seems more or less “mandatory,” in that the product of intuition arrives 
in consciousness without any explicit decision on the part of the agent, whereas 
reasoning is not mandatory; if I decide not to reason about something, I do not get any 
product of reasoning at all.  As Haidt puts it, “intuition occurs quickly, effortlessly, and 
automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness, 
whereas reasoning occurs more slowly, requires some effort, and involves at least some 
steps that are accessible to consciousness” (Haidt 2001, 818).   
 There are two main accounts available for how moral judgments might operate 
under etiological cognitivism.  What we might call the rationalist model claims that 
moral judgments are typically reasoned judgments, and that these judgments cause moral 
emotions.  By contrast, the SI model holds that moral judgments are typically intuitions, 
and that these cause moral emotions.  Here I will turn to an example to illustrate the 
difference, drawing again on Lazarus’ account of etiological cognitivism. 
 Suppose Elizabeth sees two men holding hands.  She processes this visual input 
and forms a judgment about the information it contains.  Her primary appraisal of the 
situation must then indicate whether what she sees is goal-relevant, congruent with her 
goals, and ego-involved.  Here, we can see that how she appraises the situation will 
depend on various beliefs or dispositional feelings she might have.  If Elizabeth is a 
 55 
social liberal, she may not have any negative beliefs or feelings toward two men holding 
hands.  If this is the case, she may appraise the situation as irrelevant to her goals and the 
two other features of primary appraisal need not even be invoked.  Something which is 
irrelevant to one’s goals is neither congruent nor incongruent with them, and further, will 
not involve the person’s ego.  What this amounts to saying is that Elizabeth would form 
no specific emotion as a result of seeing the two men holding hands.  Moreover, it seems 
perfectly consistent to say that she might not form any judgment whatsoever about her 
experience. 
 Now take another woman, Sarah, who is a social conservative and deeply 
disgusted by any overt display of homosexuality.  Lazarus provides the following table 
for disgust: 
Primary Appraisal Components 
1. If there is goal relevance, then any emotion is possible, including disgust. 
2. If there is goal incongruence, then only negative emotions are possible, 
including disgust. 
3. If any of the six types of ego-involvement is at risk of being contaminated by a 
"poisonous idea," then disgust will occur.  
[Note:] No secondary appraisal components are essential. (Lazarus, 261) 
This account will help us to explain why Sarah experiences the emotion she does.  
When she sees the same two men holding hands, she appraises it much differently than 
Elizabeth did.  Her primary appraisal of her sensory information is that it is relevant to 
her goals (avoiding homosexuals) and incongruent with her goals (she is not now 
avoiding homosexuals).  For the last component of Sarah’s primary appraisal, Lazarus 
provides a list of six different kinds of ego-involvement: self- and social esteem, moral 
values, ego-ideals, meanings and ideas, other persons and their well-being, and life goals 
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(Lazarus 2001, 58).  There are a number of possibilities here, but we should see that if 
any of these ego-involvement categories is “at risk of being contaminated by 
[metaphorically speaking] a ‘poisonous idea,’ then disgust will occur” (Lazarus 1991, 
261).  Virtually any of these types of ego-involvement could be present, though we 
should resist explaining her emotion on the basis of moral values, as that would make 
the forthcoming account look circular.  The point is that, according to etiological 
cognitivism, her disgust is caused by a certain kind of judgment.  On this account, her 
judgment might very well be intuitive.  Sarah need not actively think about what her 
moral values indicate she should feel; she might just be the kind of person who does not 
like to be around homosexuals.  
 Now, if we ask Sarah why she formed the judgment she does, and ask Elizabeth 
why she did not form a judgment at all, each would typically be able to provide a reason.  
Perhaps Elizabeth would say she does not care because two men holding hands does not 
harm her in any way.  Perhaps Sarah would say that she is offended (disgusted) because 
two men holding hands (at least in most Western culture) indicates a romantic interest, 
and she believes such a romantic interest has been forbidden by God.  Each woman 
would thus be both explaining and justifying her judgment (or lack thereof).  
 Now, the crucial question for the etiological cognitivist is this: what should we 
consider to be the cause of the judgment (or lack of judgment) each woman makes?  
Should we accept what each woman says when she responds (namely, that each has a 
belief which entails either a judgment or no judgment), or should we say that the actual 
cause is each woman’s intuitive appraisal of the situation?  This question hinges on 
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whether we have good evidence to suppose that each woman arrived at her judgment or 
lack thereof through a mental process accessible to consciousness, or whether the 
product of the judgment arrived in her consciousness spontaneously.  This will 
differentiate whether her judgment of the situation was a reasoned or intuition. 
 The rationalist model takes it that we have good evidence to believe the former.  
The SI model takes it that we have good evidence for the latter.  In what follows, I will 
relate some of the evidence in favor of the SI model.  I will argue that the cause of at 
least most moral judgments is not the moral beliefs one consciously draws up to defend 
one’s judgment, but rather intuitive judgments which are not consciously accessible.  As 
Haidt argues, “when faced with a social demand for a verbal justification [of one’s 
judgment], one becomes a lawyer trying to build a case rather than a judge searching for 
the truth” (Haidt 2001, 814). 
 Before proceeding, we should be careful to distinguish three possibilities for 
which kinds of moral judgments there might be: (1) moral judgments are always 
sophisticated judgments, (2) moral judgments are always intuitive judgments, and (3) 
both kinds of judgments exist.  As one might be able to see, both (1) and (2) are quite 
strong theses. 
 It is not immediately clear whether Haidt holds (2) or (3).  He does claim that 
“The [SI] model proposes that moral judgments appear in consciousness automatically 
and effortlessly as the result of moral intuitions” (Haidt 2001, 818).  Haidt often speaks 
of subjects’ justification for their moral judgment in a situation as “post hoc.”  Indeed, 
this is a core tenet of the SI model (Haidt 2001, 822).  The idea is not that people never 
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produce reasoned judgments, but that when subjects do make them, they are simply an 
attempt to dress up an intuition.  One could construe this as the claim that reasoned 
judgments do not exist, but are rather just rationalizations.  Alternatively, we could see 
Haidt as recognizing the existence of reasoned judgments, but thinking they play a much 
more restricted role than the rationalist thinks they do.  I think the latter interpretation is 
better, as calling reasoned judgments “rationalizations” runs the risk of begging the 
question on the normative issues I will mention in the next section.   
It is also important to distinctly characterize the restricted role of reasoned 
judgments in the SI model.  To this end, we should distinguish two different types of 
reasoned judgments.  An ultimately reasoned judgment is a moral judgment which is not 
caused or (subjectively) justified by any intuition.  A proximately reasoned judgment is 
the opposite: a moral judgment which is caused or (subjectively) justified by an 
intuition, though the causal or justificatory chain may be long and complex.10  With this 
distinction in hand, Haidt’s position can be described thusly: reasoned judgments exist, 
but they are always proximately reasoned judgments.  This makes the rationalist 
alternative particularly vivid as well: reasoned judgments exist, and at least some of 
them are ultimately reasoned judgments.  
 There is a normative dimension involved here.  That is, which kind of judgment 
should we consider justifying?  There seem to be a number of positions one could hold: 
(A) Intuitions never justify other moral beliefs. (B) Only intuitions justify other moral 
                                               
10 In using subjective justification here because I mean to emphasize that the definition of “ultimately” and 
“proximately” reasoned moral judgments does not depend on the moral judgment’s being objectively 
justified.  One could imagine ultimately reasoned moral judgments which are in fact objectively 
unjustified, though the person doing the judging thinks they are justified. 
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beliefs.  Both of these possibilities might (but do not necessarily) represent forms of 
foundationalism.  Here there is a third option as well: (C) some mix of (moral) intuitions 
and reasoned (moral) judgments is justifying, as long as this mix is coherent.  This 
represents reflective equilibrium, or coherentism.  I mention this question in order to 
shelve it, as it will become apropos only in the next section. 
 Now, on to the evidence.  The SI model’s main hypothesis, that reasoned 
judgments are always proximately reasoned judgments, can be experimentally verified 
by means of scenarios which elicit moral emotions (and thus, under etiological 
cognitivism, moral judgments) but give subjects little with which to consciously reason.  
As a contrast case, first consider a situation where a subject would have much to reason 
with.  If experimenters pose a scenario to a subject in which someone steals clothes from 
a department store, the subject will find it easy to explain and justify her anger about the 
action with reference to the harms that the theft causes.  She might say that one should 
not steal because it harms the store, causes prices to go up for its patrons, etc.  This is a 
situation where her emotional judgment is strongly supported by reasons she gives, and 
that fact makes a rationalist interpretation plausible.  That is, the rationalist would say 
that she appraises the hypothetical by consciously noting that the situation is relevant, 
goal incongruent, ego-involved, and includes blame.  All of these elements can be 
(perhaps in less technical terms) avowed by the subject as reasons for her moral 
judgment and the resultant moral emotion (anger).  These kinds of examples have 
traditionally led philosophers and psychologists to suppose that for moral judgments 
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generally, the reasons one consciously gives for one’s judgment are the causes of that 
judgment (and thus also the causes of one’s moral emotion).   
Yet we now have strong evidence that this generalization does not hold.  This is 
because when subjects in a similar experiment are asked to judge a scenario involving 
putatively morally objectionable actions, but these actions have been stripped of any 
possible harmfulness, we find that subjects do not change their moral judgments, and the 
belief that these actions are morally wrong endures.  For example, one experiment asked 
questions which involved eating one’s already dead pet dog, cleaning one’s toilet with 
the national flag, or eating a chicken carcass one has just used for masturbation (Haidt et 
al. 1993, 617).  Even though subjects could not explain how any harm was involved, 
they still judged that the actions described in the experiment were wrong.  If the 
conscious reasons subjects give were really the cause of their moral judgments, it would 
be difficult to explain the tenacity with which these subjects hold judgments in these 
cases.  One would think that once one’s reasons for holding a judgment had been 
defeated, if those reasons really were the cause of one’s moral judgment, one would 
(perhaps after some time) reverse such a judgment.  As Haidt’s experiments show, this is 
definitely not the case. 
In another experiment, Haidt aimed to get at exactly how difficult these intuitive 
moral judgments are to reverse.  This experiment involved five different stories, two of 
which I will focus on here: the cannibalism story and the incest story.  The cannibalism 
story involves a medical school student who cuts off a piece of a human cadaver, cooks 
it thoroughly (to eliminate the risk of disease), and eats it.  The incest story involves a 
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brother and sister who decide to have sex while on vacation in France.  Both use a form 
of birth control, they only do it once, and “[t]hey keep that night as a special secret 
between them, which makes them feel even closer to each other” (Haidt et al. 2000, 16).  
In this experiment, Haidt’s experimenters played “devil’s advocate,” and questioned the 
reasons that subjects gave in response to these stories.  In both stories, experimenters 
pointed out to negatively judging subjects that there was no harm done in the scenario. 
The experiment’s results were surprising.  For the cannibalism and incest 
scenarios, subjects very seldom changed their judgments when their arguments were 
(ostensibly) defeated by the experimenters.  For the cannibalism scenario, only thirteen 
percent judged that the action in question was morally permissible, and this number only 
rose to twenty eight percent after the experimenters rebutted the arguments of those who 
judged negatively.  This means that only seventeen percent of the subjects changed their 
minds.  For the incest scenario, twenty percent judged that the action in question was 
morally wrong, and again after having their arguments rebutted, only seventeen percent 
of the overall participants changed their minds (Haidt et al, 2000, 14). 
What this evidence indicates is that for at least some moral questions, 
individuals’ moral judgments are highly intransigent.  That is, even when told how their 
arguments fail, subjects still overwhelmingly hold to their judgment even in the absence 
of compelling reasons for holding it.  This gives us some preliminary evidence that 
when there is a conflict between an intuition and a reasoned judgment, intuition 
generally wins out. 
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In these kinds of experiments Haidt reports a phenomenon he calls “moral 
dumbfounding”: the tendency of subjects to “stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their 
inability to find supporting reasons” when standard harm-based objections to the 
behavior in question have been preempted.  This phenomenon is especially prevalent in 
Haidt & Hersh (2001), which involves an experiment that examines the differences 
between liberals and conservatives with regard to sexual morality.  Students (broadly 
self-classified as liberals, moderates, or conservatives) were presented with a number of 
scenarios, some of which involved homosexual anal sex, a woman masturbating while 
cuddling with her teddy bear, and consensual incest between a brother and sister where 
both used a form of birth control.  Moral dumbfounding was extremely common (though 
not omnipresent) in these scenarios.  In the scenario involving homosexual sex, sixty 
percent of subjects self-classified as conservative exhibited moral dumbfounding.  
Subjects self-classified as liberals demonstrated moral dumbfounding at the same rate 
(sixty percent) for a scenario in which “a man likes to masturbate while his dog willingly 
licks his owner’s genitals and seems to enjoy it” (Haidt & Hersh 2001, p. 197).  
Remember what this means: when asked about these scenarios, a full sixty percent of 
these groups of subjects could not articulate any reason for their positions and (perhaps 
understandably, given the content) showed signs of discomfort, stuttering, and laughing.  
Moreover, for the former scenario, conservatives baldly stated their affective response as 
the justification for their view at a rate of forty percent, with liberals doing the same for 
the latter scenario at a rate of thirty eight percent (ibid., p. 209).   
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What these experiments are intended to show is that the reasoned judgments the 
subjects provided were entirely parasitic on their intuitions.  To illustrate this fact, 
consider the following example where my reasoned judgment is not parasitic in this way.  
Suppose I tell you that I believe that the next train will come into the station at 12:15PM.  
You ask me why I think this is the case.  I show you a schedule which indicates that 
time.  But you notice that the schedule I have is outdated: the new schedule, which you 
have in your hand, indicates it will come in at 12:30 PM.  You point out this fact, and 
realizing I have made a mistake, I change my belief.  In this case I formed a reasoned 
judgment that the train would come in at 12:15 PM; I relied on the schedule I have to 
consciously infer that the train will arrive at that time.  But upon being told that the 
schedule I used to infer this information is unreliable, I realize that my inference was 
incorrect and change my belief. 
Now, if I were to acknowledge that the schedule was unreliable but still believed 
that I knew the train would come in at 12:15PM, this would show that my reasoned 
judgment was not in fact the cause of my belief.  In such a case, you might ask me why I 
believe that the train will come in at that time.  If I cannot provide any reason 
whatsoever, it appears that the only possible explanation for my belief is that I have 
formed some intuition that the train must come in at this time, despite all the facts at my 
disposal.  In these cases it is usually right to say that, while I have no reason to believe 
what I do, I have a “hunch” or a “gut feeling” that it will.   
This kind of gut feeling appears to be what is driving the subjects’ responses in 
these experiments.  When the reasons which purport to factor into their reasoned 
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judgment are preempted (much like you pointing out that my train schedule is 
unreliable), the subjects cling to the judgment anyway.  The reasoned judgments that 
subjects make in these cases do not independently support the subjects’ intuitive 
judgments. 
What is not entirely clear is whether the evidence adduced above licenses us in 
believing that all reasoned judgments are proximate in this sense.  It may be that for 
these strange cases people rely on intuitions, but that in the normal case, the rationalist 
account is correct.  In line with this reasoning, I should note one interesting wrinkle in 
the experiment on sexual morality just described (Haidt & Hersh 2001), which might 
cause problems for the SI model.  Haidt found that conservatives were generally much 
more likely to become morally dumbfounded than liberals.  The difference, Haidt thinks, 
is that liberals “often separated their own emotional reactions from their moral 
judgments” (ibid., p. 195).  Haidt quotes one liberal subject in response to a question on 
the permissibility of gay sex: 
I’d have to say it would make me feel weird. That’s my first instinct. Yeah, I 
mean there’s a weird kind of thing going on in my head there. I feel like there’s a 
way I’m going to act and a way to act based on this preconceived ideology I have 
about sex being okay between people, no matter what sex they are. You know, 
instantly a warning bell comes up, and that bugs me. I quickly discard it; I mean I 
recognize it and then discard it because it makes me feel silly. (ibid, p. 195) 
 
This might lead one to believe that in this experiment at least some liberals were making 
ultimately reasoned judgments that independently contradicted their intuition, and that 
they favored the reasoned judgment over the intuitive alternative.  Engaging in a bit of 
warranted speculation, the rationalist might say that this liberal respondent came to the 
intuitive judgment that homosexual sex was wrong (hence, on etiological cognitivist 
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grounds, formed the emotion of disgust), but overrode this initial intuition and instead 
identified himself with the reasoned judgment that gay sex is permissible.  Perhaps the 
liberal’s reasoned judgment could be put into a neat, conscious inference pattern like 
this:  
 Premise 1: Disgust is not a justified basis for a moral judgment. 
Premise 2: I feel disgust at the idea of gay sex, but by premise 1, this feeling is 
irrelevant. 
Premise 3: I believe in the harm principle: an action is only wrong when it harms 
someone non-consensually. 
Premise 4: I have no reason to believe gay sex will harm anyone non-
consensually. 
 Conclusion: By premise 3 and 4, gay sex is morally permissible. 
 It seems entirely plausible that such a model could be part of a reasoned judgment, and 
that the liberal in Haidt’s study reasoned something like this.  Of course, if Haidt were to 
deny this (which I doubt), I could point to another person who does reason like this: me. 
How would a proponent of the SI model respond?  First, he might say that in this 
and other experiments there is some bias in favor of providing reasoned instead of 
intuitive judgments.  In all of Haidt’s experiments, there is some pressure on respondents 
to provide reasons and not to only rely on how the scenario feels to them.  Thus 
respondents who would have given an intuition are instead pressured to provide a 
reasoned judgment. 
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Second, he might note that Haidt’s experiments do not support the general 
conclusion that liberals always (or even often) use reasoned judgments to override their 
intuitions.  Consider again one of the scenarios posed to liberal and conservative 
subjects: “A 25-year-old man likes to masturbate while his dog willingly licks his 
owner’s genitals and seems to enjoy it” (Haidt & Hersh 2001, 197).  Earlier I mentioned 
moral dumbfounding in connection with this scenario, but just as salient is the fact that 
both conservatives and liberals state their affective response as a reason for their 
judgment at nearly the same rates (forty percent for conservatives, thirty-three percent 
for liberals) (Haidt & Hersh 2001, 209).  Liberals are clearly not overriding their 
intuitive judgment in this case.  These issues aside, what is most telling is that while 
liberals were indeed significantly less likely to state their affective response as the reason 
for their judgment (ibid.), this only occurred in response to scenarios where liberals had 
significantly less negative affect (the two scenarios where this result obtained were one 
involving gay male anal sex and another involving lesbian oral sex) (ibid., 203).  Despite 
the one example cited above, Haidt’s experiments provide evidence that liberals 
generally do not condemn certain behaviors because they feel no negative affect, not 
because they are substituting an intuition for a reasoned judgment. 
These responses are not quite good enough though; though dumbfounding is 
frequent despite a bias in the experiments in favor of independent, ultimately reasoned 
judgments, the fact that subjects can make ultimately reasoned judgments contradicts the 
main hypothesis of the SI model; the fact that liberals do not in general make ultimately 
reasoned judgments is not enough to save the SI model from this counterexample. 
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The proponent of the SI model must do more than either of these responses 
allow.  He must argue that while the liberal’s judgment does constitute an instance of a 
reasoned judgment overriding an intuition, the overriding judgment is necessarily a 
proximately reasoned judgment.  That is, somewhere along the line of explanation and 
justification, the liberal’s reasoned judgment must bottom out in an intuition.  Otherwise 
the thesis of the SI model is falsified. 
This line of argument seems to be implicit in a good deal of the SI model 
literature.  For example, Haidt explains the aforementioned liberal’s response this way: 
“because his political culture (liberalism) has a preconceived ideology that sex is entirely 
a matter of personal choice, he feels compelled to override his intuition” (Haidt & Hersh 
2001, 212).  Haidt sees this political culture as a contingent factor influencing which 
intuitions a person is liable to accept and which he is liable to override with a reasoned 
judgment.  Uninterpreted, it is easy to see that admitting this would still pose a problem 
for the SI model.  This is because one’s political culture often has many reasoned 
judgments implicit in it (the harm principle being one in the case of the aforementioned 
liberal).  If Haidt is willing to admit that these kinds of reasoned judgments occur, he 
must find a way to claim that it is because those reasoned judgments are themselves the 
results of intuitions somewhere down the line.  
We see now that the viability of the SI model depends on providing a plausible 
story for the genesis of reasoned judgments.  I do not contend that this matter has been 
settled.  However, there is one body of research which is promising for the SI model’s 
proponent: the CAD triad hypothesis.  This hypothesis claims that “[three] emotions—
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contempt, anger, and disgust—are typically elicited, across cultures, by violations of 
[three] moral codes” (Rozin et al. 1999, 574).  These moral codes can be understood as 
families of moral judgments.  On this hypothesis, one of three main moral emotions is 
elicited as a result of a given violation: contempt, anger, and disgust.  Rozin et al. label 
these three codes community, autonomy, and divinity.  The first emotion, contempt, is 
associated with violations of the ethics of community.  This emotion is triggered when 
an individual fails to conform to social rules regarding rank and hierarchy.  The second 
emotion, anger, is associated with violations of the ethics of autonomy.  This emotion 
arises as a response to “insults, transgressions, and rights violations against the self or 
those close to the self” (Rozin et al. 1999, 575).  The third emotion, disgust, is associated 
with violations of the ethics of divinity.  It is triggered when an individual violates 
norms established to protect the soul or world against pollution or degradation (ibid.). 
 These three families of moral judgments are further defined as follows: 
1.  [The ethics of Autonomy] Individual freedom/rights violations. In these cases 
an action is wrong because it directly hurts another person, or infringes upon 
his/her rights or freedoms as an individual. To decide if an action is wrong, 
you think about things like harm, rights, justice, freedom, fairness, 
individualism, and the importance of individual choice and liberty.  
 
2. [The ethics of Community]  In these cases an action is wrong because a 
person fails to carry out his or her duties within a community, or to the social 
hierarchy within the community. To decide if an action is wrong, you think 
about things like duty, role-obligation, respect for authority, loyalty, group 
honor, interdependence, and the preservation of the community. 
 
3. [The ethics of Divinity] Divinity/purity violations. In these cases a person 
disrespects the sacredness of God, or causes impurity or degradation to 
himself/herself, or to others. To decide if an action is wrong, you think about 
things like sin, the natural order of things, sanctity, and the protection of the 
soul or the world from degradation and spiritual defilement. (Rozin et al. 
1999, 575-576) 
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First let me make a terminological point.  There has been some question about whether 
“the ethics of divinity” is the proper name for a family of moral judgments which does 
not always invoke a deity.  Following Prinz, I will henceforth refer to “the ethics of 
divinity” as “the ethics of the natural order” (Prinz 2007, 73).    
In tandem with these three basic moral emotions, three other emotions form the 
basis of moral responses to condemnation in the three CAD areas: shame, 
embarrassment, and guilt.  These three emotions form the SEG triad, and each serve to 
“motivate the individual to want to fit in, to behave in a culturally acceptable fashion, 
and to avoid harming people” (Rozin et al. 1999, 574).  These emotions appear to be 
responses to contempt, anger, or disgust on the part of others, but are not well correlated 
with any of these individual emotions.  This element of the theory is not yet fully 
understood, as these emotions appear to be the subject of more cultural variation than the 
CAD triad.  Work is still under way in an effort to taxonomize them. 
 Once again, the CAD triad hypothesis claims that these three moral emotions are 
typically elicited cross-culturally as a result of violations of one of the families of moral 
judgments.  This hypothesis has so far held up to experimentation.  Rozin et al. (1999) 
conducted an experiment in which American and Japanese participants were read 
different scenarios in which some rule violation occurs and asked which of the three 
emotions a hypothetical person who witnessed such a violation would express.  Subjects 
responded in two ways.  First, they indicated which facial expressions they expected the 
hypothetical person to display.  Second, they described the emotion that the hypothetical 
witness would feel toward the violator, and were limited to three options: contempt, 
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anger, and disgust (and their Japanese translations).  The results were impressive, though 
not perfect.  The model predicted which facial expression subjects would choose in all 
three categories of rule violations with a high degree of accuracy.  More respondents 
chose the predicted facial expression than chose either of the other two facial 
expressions combined, which far outstrips mere chance.  The model also predicted 
which word the subjects would choose in response to each of the hypothetical rule 
violations, though with somewhat less accuracy than on the facial recognition task.  This 
experiment lends at least prima facie credibility to the idea that different moral 
judgments are accompanied by different moral emotions, and that these emotions can be 
taxonomized effectively. 
 The CAD triad hypothesis represents a possible account of the genesis of 
reasoned judgments for the SI model.  The basic idea is put quite well by Haidt: 
A child is born prepared to develop moral intuitions in all three ethics, but her 
local cultural environment generally stresses only one or two of the ethics. 
Intuitions within culturally supported ethics become sharper and more 
chronically accessible … whereas intuitions within unsupported ethics become 
weaker and less accessible. (Haidt 2001, 827) 
 
On this theory, the three codes of the CAD triad are families of moral judgments which 
come naturally to human beings, but are stressed differently by different cultures.11  If 
one culture stresses the ethics of the natural order, children growing up in that culture 
will be apt to express intuitions which conform to that code.   
                                               
11 Though Haidt appears to think that culture has the largest impact on the variation in which moral codes 
are emphasized, we need not think culture is the only factor, or, contra Haidt, even the most important 
factor in code variation.  The important thing for the argument at hand is the existence of the variation, not 
the source of it, which is another question entirely. 
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The SI model’s proponent must hold that reasoned judgments are always inferred 
from intuitions.  To see how this would happen, consider two different children, Hector 
and Alyssa.  Hector grows up in a culture which stresses the ethics of the natural order.  
He is taught that feeling disgust in a scenario is a justified basis for a negative moral 
judgment against whoever is involved in that scenario.  Alyssa grows up in a culture 
which stresses the ethics of autonomy and downplays the ethics of the natural order.  As 
a result, Alyssa is taught more or less the opposite of Hector: when she experiences 
disgust, she is taught that it is not a justified basis for a negative moral judgment.  Now 
suppose these children grow up, and when they are adults, they are subjected to one of 
Haidt’s experiments.  When both individuals are given a scenario which evokes disgust 
in human beings generally (the existence of these scenarios is supported by the CAD 
triad hypothesis), both will form a negative intuition about the object of their disgust.  
Moreover, both will form a reasoned judgment as a result of this intuition.  But because 
of the culture each was raised in, the reasoned judgment of each will be different!  
Hector will form a negative reasoned judgment which supports his intuition against the 
object of disgust.  He might say that the scenario is offensive to God, or that it is 
unnatural, etc.  Alyssa will have formed the same intuition as Hector, and this intuition 
will (as per etiological cognitivism) cause disgust.  Because Alyssa’s culture downplays 
the ethics of the natural order, however, she does not recognize disgust as a legitimate 
basis for a reasoned judgment.  If the scenario involves some sort of harm, she may be 
able form a compatible reasoned judgment against the object of her disgust based on the 
ethics of autonomy.  But if the scenario does not involve harm, she will have to form a 
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reasoned judgment that contradicts her intuition, and in all likelihood, will hold this 
reasoned judgment to be overriding.   
Of course, the data in Haidt’s experiments so far indicates that most people will 
simply judge the object of their disgust negatively, even when their reasoned judgment is 
obviously unsatisfactory.  That is, most people will attempt to find harm in scenarios 
where harmfulness has been preemptively excluded.  When the experimenters calmly 
point out that their arguments fail, most subjects fall back on their negative intuition 
about the subject.   
Haidt also mentioned that we should expect certain intuitions from certain groups 
(e.g. liberals) to be weaker than the intuitions of others (e.g. conservatives), largely due 
to cultural influence.  This expectation is supported in the evidence, where we see 
liberals expressing less affective response than conservatives (though the difference was 
not very large for some scenarios) (Haidt & Hersh 2001, 211).  In keeping with 
etiological cognitivism, we can say that a weaker intuition causes a weaker emotional 
response.  Some liberals had a weak enough intuition that they formed little emotional 
response at all and thus had no problem giving a reasoned judgment on the basis of the 
ethics of autonomy.  Other liberals had a stronger intuition (and a stronger affective 
response), though because of their cultural background, they still relied on the ethics of 
autonomy to override their intuition. 
This genesis story explains how the liberal in Haidt’s experiments can form a 
reasoned judgment which overrides his intuition without forcing the SI model to admit 
that any reasoned judgments are ultimately reasoned judgments.  When the liberal 
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overrides his intuition, the reasoned judgment he overrides it with is itself reducible to a 
set of intuitions within a different code of ethics (in this case, the ethics of autonomy).  
For when we ask why the overriding liberal identifies with his reasoned judgment 
instead of his intuition, it can only be because he accepts all the premises in an explicit 
reasoning pattern modeled above).  From here we need only ask: why does he accept the 
premises?  To restate, here is the argument that I proposed the liberal might be using: 
Premise 1: Disgust is not a justified basis for a moral judgment. 
Premise 2: I feel disgust at the idea of gay sex, but by premise 1, this feeling is 
irrelevant. 
Premise 3: I believe in the harm principle: an action is only wrong when it harms 
someone non-consensually. 
Premise 4: I have no reason to believe gay sex will harm anyone non-
consensually. 
 Conclusion: By premise 3 and 4, gay sex is morally permissible. 
Premises 2 and 4 are comprised of factual information about the scenario at hand.  
Premise 1 is caused by his immersion from early childhood in a culture which discounts 
the ethics of the natural order.  And premise 4 is a combination of that immersion and of 
other intuitions in scenarios or experiences which involve harm.  Therefore the liberal’s 
reasoned judgment is ultimately caused by his culture and other intuitions.  If this 
genesis story is correct, the liberal does not constitute a counterexample to the general 
thesis of the SI model: that all reasoned judgments are proximate reasoned judgments. 
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 Let me sum up this section in somewhat more ordinary language.  What the SI 
model amounts to is the claim that the ultimate cause of all moral judgments is intuition, 
not moral reasoning.  Moral reasoning, where it exists, is always causally constrained by 
which types of moral intuitions (and their accompanying emotions) a culture happens to 
emphasize (or reject) as a sound basis for moral reasoning.  We have some evidence that 
(for humans generally) a few moral emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust) are elicited 
by certain regular features of situations.  Intuitions tend to converge in these areas, 
though there exist large variations both in the features cultures see as salient in these 
situations and in the types of intuitions cultures find acceptable in forming reasoned 
judgments about these situations.  It appears that these cultural variations in moral 
intuitions are the root of moral disagreement generally, and the SI model combined with 
the CAD triad indicates that this root is buried very deep.  If moral reasoning really is 
always just caused by moral intuition and culture, then this has serious implications for 
theories of moral epistemology which aim at convergence on moral truth through moral 
reasoning.  In the next section, I will explore these implications.   
3.3 Implications for Normative Theories 
 Earlier I mentioned (in passing) that there is a normative dimension in play here.  
That is, there are a number of positions one might hold with respect to which kinds of 
moral judgments are justifying.  With the evidence for the SI model on the table, we are 
now in a position to evaluate what this evidence implies for such normative accounts.  
Recall the three options mentioned in the previous section: (A) intuitions never justify 
other moral beliefs, (B) only intuitions justify other moral beliefs, and (C) some mix of 
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moral intuitions and reasoned (moral) judgments is justifying.  I mentioned that (A) and 
(B) might be plausibly considered versions of foundationalism.  Though my argument is 
chiefly aimed at (C), it is worth taking a moment to examine why the evidence for the SI 
model also indicts normative accounts like (A) and (B).  It is important to note that my 
argument here only applies to objective forms of foundationalism and coherentism which 
claim that there is one set of moral standards which apply to all individuals.  Subjective 
forms of these theories, which admit of various forms of relativism, are not affected by 
the arguments that follow. 
 First, let us consider (A).  An objective foundationalist who holds this position is 
committed to denying that any of the codes of ethics or the families of intuitions which 
these codes embody is a justifying basis for one’s other moral beliefs.  This is easy 
enough to see, because such a foundationalist denies this justifying role to any intuition 
whatsoever.  This kind of foundationalist would say that whatever one’s moral 
intuitions, one should always override them with a reasoned judgment.  Sometimes our 
reasoned judgments and intuitions are in sync, and sometimes they are not, but when 
there is a conflict, we should always prefer the reasoned judgment. 
 The problem for this account is that I have given (what I consider to be) 
compelling evidence that reasoned moral judgments are always only proximately 
reasoned.  That is, whenever one has a reasoned judgment, it is ultimately derived from 
the intuitions one’s culture finds acceptable.  If this is the case, it seems that there is no 
objective basis for preferring one’s reasoned judgments over one’s intuitions.  
Individuals from different cultures will provide different reasoned judgments, and we 
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have no objective means of determining which of these judgments to prefer.  If this is the 
case, we are not capable of this kind of objective knowledge.   
 Next, consider (B).  This would be a form of intuitionism.  Any objective version 
of this account seems to be even more transparently undermined by the SI model.  This 
is because there are significant differences in the intuitions of individuals from different 
cultural backgrounds.  If only intuitions justify other moral beliefs, it seems that this 
form of objective foundationalism must hold that one set of these intuitions is the correct 
set.  But how could we determine which set is correct?  Obviously one cannot simply 
rely on one’s own culture in determining this set of correct intuitions, because one very 
quickly runs the risk of ethnocentrism.  But even more important is the fact that there 
seems to be no obvious and objective method of determining which code of ethics (and 
which family of intuitions) to emphasize or deemphasize.  Thus if a form of 
foundationalism asserts that only intuitions ultimately justify reasoned judgments, it 
seems that this form of foundationalism must also necessarily be subjective. 
Now, what about (C), which claims that some mix of intuitions and reasoned 
moral judgments is justifying, as long as this mix is coherent?  There appear to be two 
problems for this kind of account.  To get at these problems, we will need to understand 
two different theses that the coherentist might hold. 
Descriptive Coherentism: at least one individual actually can employ 
coherentism in her efforts to obtain subjective justification for her system of 
morality. 
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Normative Coherentism: Coherentism is how one ought to justify one’s system of 
morality. 
It might not be immediately apparent why this distinction is necessary.  After all, we are 
talking about whether the SI model has implications for normative theories like 
coherentism, not whether individuals actually do use coherentist reasoning to get 
subjective justification.  In what follows, I will argue that the evidence for the SI model 
puts Descriptive Coherentism in doubt, and that this in turn throws Normative 
Coherentism into doubt as well. 
Consider what the evidence for the SI model indicates.  First let us focus just on 
the cases where subjects cannot find reasoned judgments to support their response to a 
scenario, or where their reasoned judgments are quickly rebutted by the experimenters 
but their negative judgment persists.  In these cases, we might rightly describe subjects’ 
judgments as stubborn in the face of reasons.  Indeed, pointing to these cases, Haidt 
argues that “[t]he refutation of … arguments does not cause people to change their 
minds; it only forces them to work harder to find replacement arguments” (Haidt & 
Hersh 2001, p. 218).  If Haidt’s experiments show anything, it is that in these cases, if 
we are to convince someone to change her position on a moral question, she will not be 
motivated to change that position simply because her reasons have been defeated.  When 
a person refuses to change her position as a result of her reasons being defeated, we have 
good reason to believe that she has an intuition about the case at hand.  As I have argued, 
in these cases her intuition is driving her judgment.  It is these kinds of intuitions, which 
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drive moral judgment even in the absence of a reasoned judgment, which I will refer to 
as “intransigent.”   
It is not immediately obvious that the moral judgment a person identifies with is 
always caused by intransigent intuitions.  Indeed, this is a strong thesis, and the 
rationalist might again point to the overriding liberal as a counterexample.  However, 
here I need only point to the argument that all reasoned judgments are only proximately 
reasoned.  The overriding liberal is not making an ultimately reasoned judgments.  
Rather, he is relying on an intransigent intuition as well; it is just not the intuition which 
is being tested in the experiment.  Again, the idea here is that when the liberal overrides 
his intuitive disgust against the idea of gay sex, he is still relying on intuitions which 
would themselves be immune to defeat by any reasoned judgment.  If we were to test the 
intuitions which he relies on in making his positive reasoned judgment about gay sex, I 
contend that we would find those intuitions just as intransigent as those of the 
conservative who does not override his intuition in this case at all.  Of course, we should 
note that the overriding liberal still has (according to etiological cognitivism) a negative 
judgment about gay sex; it is just not the judgment he identifies with.  The thesis I am 
advocating here is not that all intuitions are intransigent, but that all intuitions which 
cause the moral judgment one ultimately identifies with are intransigent.  I will refer to 
this thesis as “the problem of intransigence.” 
This problem gives us reason to believe that Descriptive Coherentism is false.  
After all, if all the judgments one ultimately identifies with are based on intransigent 
intuitions, this immediately implies (by the definition of intransigent intuitions) that they 
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cannot be changed as a result of reasoned judgments.  In this context, some intuitions 
appear to be (for lack of a better description) “anchored down” in one’s psychology.  
They provide the bounds within which moral reasoning occurs in the first place.  Thus it 
appears that the clean picture of coherentism from section two in which a person 
engages in reflective equilibrium with all doxastic options open to him is not 
psychologically accurate.   
Of course, this does not mean that the moral judgments we identify with cannot 
be changed at all.  Clearly culture (and perhaps a host of other sociological factors) 
influences which intuitions a person finds acceptable, and these factors have an effect 
over the course of one’s lifetime.  But these sociological factors influence a person at a 
level below that of conscious reasoning.  Indeed, the problem of intransigence persists 
even when we appear to have evidence that someone has changed her mind as a result of 
an argument.  As Haidt hypothesizes, “reasoned persuasion works not by providing 
logically compelling arguments but by triggering new affectively valenced intuitions in 
the listener” (Haidt 2001, 819).  Reasoned argument may sometimes change an 
individual’s mind because it directs her focus to another intuition that she has (a strategy 
Prinz calls “norm pitting” (Prinz 2007, 289)).  However, if the SI model is correct, it 
cannot get her to drop an intuition in favor of a reasoned judgment which is not caused 
or subjectively justified by any intuition whatsoever.  
It is easy to see how if Descriptive Coherentism is false, Normative Coherentism 
is fatally undermined.  The problem for Normative Coherentism arises because it hangs 
(in a practical way) on the truth of Descriptive Coherentism.  Remember that Normative 
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Coherentism is the thesis that coherentism is the way one ought to justify one’s system 
of morality.  Here we need only invoke a fairly uncontroversial point: “ought” implies 
“can.”  If intuitions are always the cause of reasoned judgments, we cannot engage in the 
process that coherentism requires of us.  How can one then say that we ought to follow 
coherentism if we want to justify our system of morality?   
Of course, a system of beliefs which is bounded by intransigent intuitions is not 
necessarily an incoherent system.  As long as a system’s intransigent intuitions are 
coherent, in fact, it seems inevitable that the rest of the system will be as well.  Whether 
they are or not is a matter of empirical fact, but this fact is not in principle hidden from 
future research. If this were the case, both Descriptive and Normative Coherentism 
would be true.  Moreover, even if both theses are (at present) false, there is nothing 
preventing them from becoming true in the future.  The right set of cultural and 
sociological factors might produce a coherent set of intransigent intuitions in at least one 
person, and that is enough for Descriptive Coherentism.  Such a person would then 
(automatically) be capable of meeting the “ought” requirement of Normative 
Coherentism.  It would be a strange result if one’s epistemic justification relied on 
factors which appear to be outside of one’s rational control, but this is indeed where we 
find ourselves if we still want to argue that both theses are true. 
As you might be able to see, there are two possible ramifications of the problem 
of intransigence.  First, we may think that, because our ability to live up to Descriptive 
Coherentism is completely out of our rational control, Normative Coherentism should be 
abandoned and we should look elsewhere for a viable method of justification.  Second, it 
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may be that Normative Coherentism is indeed true, in spite of the fact that we can never 
live up to it.  If this is the case, it appears that we cannot ever obtain justification for our 
systems of morality, unless, as mentioned before, the right set of cultural and 
sociological factors aligns for us to be (miraculously!) justified. 
At the very least, we should see the problem of intransigence resulting in a form 
of the MCS objection.  This is because if we are not able to alter the judgments we 
identify with except when our intransigent intuitions are altered, it seems obvious that (at 
a minimum) no agreement among people with sufficiently different backgrounds is 
ultimately possible.  Of course, there are again two possibilities here: only one coherent 
system is possible with the right set of cultural and sociological factors, or many 
coherent systems are possible with a number of different cultural and sociological 
factors.  This is once more an empirical question.  If the former is the case, there is still 
some question as to whether someone who (more or less) accidentally adopts such a 
system is really justified in holding that system.12  If the latter is the case, this is a 
straightforward MCS objection. 
Yet this is not the only problem for Normative Coherentism.  The problem of 
intransigence relies on the perhaps controversial argument that all reasoned judgments 
are the causal product of intransigent intuitions.  Though I think there is some good 
evidence for that position, the second problem arises even if we assume, contra all the 
arguments in the previous section, that some reasoned judgments are ultimately 
                                               
12 My intuitions on this are not clear one way or the other.  Obviously such a person would believe for the 
right reasons (they hold a coherent system), but would they believe in the right way? 
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reasoned judgments.  This would imply that Descriptive Coherentism is true and 
preempt the “ought implies can” argument against Normative Coherentism. 
This next problem I have in mind is also a species of the MCS objection, and 
comes about much more straightforwardly.  The main line of reasoning is this: because 
we have good evidence to presume that any given system will have at least some 
intransigent intuitions, it is overwhelmingly likely that multiple coherent systems of 
morality will arise.  This is due to the nature of these intuitions; intransigent intuitions, I 
contend, will ultimately skew any process of reflective equilibrium in which they play a 
part.  Thus when two different individuals have two incommensurable intransigent 
intuitions, they will almost always end up holding divergent coherent systems of 
morality.  This result is even more likely if the two people in question have many 
incommensurable intransigent intuitions.  I will call this problem the “limited problem of 
intransigence,” and contend that it should be seen as a species of the MCS objection. 
 Let us return to an example from Haidt & Hersh (2001).  Suppose you are a 
social conservative in this experiment who judges that consensual gay sex is wrong.  
What theoretical considerations might lead you to reject this judgment?  Now suppose 
(for the sake of argument) that you (a conservative) also hold a belief akin to the harm 
principle: an action is only wrong when it harms someone non-consensually.  Here we 
have a contradiction in your system of morality, for consensual gay sex is an ostensibly 
harmless act.  But if the judgment you identify with is based on an intransigent intuition 
against gay sex, (as many of the subjects’ judgments in Haidt’s experiments are), 
noticing the contradiction is far more likely to make you reject the harm principle than it 
 83 
is likely to make you override your original condemnative judgment of homosexual sex.  
Compare: if you are a (non-overriding) liberal and you lack a negative affective response 
to homosexual sex, and thus are not moved to condemn it, you will likely see no reason 
to abandon the harm principle at all.  Given two individuals with different intransigent 
intuitions, contradictory systems of morality will most certainly arise through a process 
of reflective equilibrium.  Indeed, it is not even necessary for two individuals to have 
intransigent intuitions; it is enough that one does and another does not (as in our 
example).  This means that the two people in our example will be justified in holding 
their systems of beliefs, and this is what makes this an MCS objection.  Insofar as the 
coherentist moral realist wants to provide an account of justification which produces just 
one set of justified beliefs, the limited problem of intransigence is nearly as damning as 
its less limited cousin. 
 Of course, the coherentist might still insist that at least one system has no 
intransigent intuitions at all, or (even) that there is some ideal system which includes a 
few intransigent intuitions which are correct despite their intransigence.  This is a real 
possibility, but based on the evidence for the SI model adduced above, I think it is 
doubtful.  We have no evidence that any individual lacks intransigent intuitions, and we 
certainly have no reason to believe that any given intransigent intuition must be correct.  
Here we must only keep the possibility in mind. 
I contend that both the strong and weak types of the moral MCS objection are 
more telling than the MCS objection mentioned in section two.  This is because of the 
differences between moral and non-moral systems of belief.  The traditional version of 
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the MCS objection was defeated in section two by asking after the explanation that an 
isolated system would have for its coherence.  (An isolated system, remember, is a 
coherent system of beliefs which rejects all experiential beliefs).  We found that isolated 
systems cannot have explanations which are as good as non-isolated systems.  A 
potential strategy for dealing with either of these MCS objections might then be to show 
that one or another moral system is isolated in a similar manner.  Unfortunately, this 
approach will not work.   
One minor problem is that it is not clear what is analogous to “experiential 
beliefs” in the moral case.  We might solve this by stipulating that intuitions are the 
moral equivalent to experiential beliefs.  But as soon as we see intuitions this way, we 
immediately come to notice a much larger problem: neither of the two coherent systems 
we are analyzing is an isolated system in this way.  The liberal accepts some intuitions 
(notably intuitions arising out of the ethics of autonomy).  The conservative accepts far 
more intuitions (from all three codes).  No one rejects all intuitions, and even if someone 
did, this would only disqualify such a person’s system, not the liberal’s or the 
conservative’s. 
It appears as though what we would need for such a strategy is a means of 
determining which family of intuitions is a legitimate source of reasoned moral 
judgments, and which is not.  We would then call isolated those systems which accepted 
only illegitimate sources of reasoned moral judgments.  But then this strategy will surely 
not work, because that is precisely the reason we brought up the analogy with isolated 
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systems in the first place!  This approach cannot solve the problem without begging the 
question.  
There is a second approach we might take, but I am equally pessimistic about it.  
We might drop the attempt to draw an analogy to isolated systems in the non-moral case 
and directly compare the liberal and conservative systems on the grounds of how well 
each explains its own coherence.  On those grounds, we might say that the liberal uses 
fewer argument patterns because he does not need to appeal to more than one family of 
intuitions in his explanation of his judgment.  But using fewer families of intuitions is 
not obviously a virtue of a moral system.  The conservative could easily point out that 
the liberal is merely excluding what to him (the conservative) are important intuitions.  
In the end, I do not think we can get an adequate handle on how well each system 
explains its own coherence, so this will not provide an adequate means of overcoming 
either of these moral versions of the MCS objection. 
3.4 Implications for Coherentist Moral Realism 
 If we really cannot overcome these MCS objections through an explanatory 
requirement on coherent systems, it appears as though we have no means of calling one 
system less justified than another.  Given the evidence that these systems will arise 
(through either the weak or strong version of this objection), we should turn our attention 
to how this fact affects the coherentist moral realist.  Here it is important to emphasize 
that the view sees coherentism as a method for deriving objective moral facts (Brink 
1989, 1989).  Moreover, Brink’s coherentist account in particular relies on realist 
second-order factual beliefs about one’s system of moral beliefs.  These beliefs are 
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realist because they ascribe the status of objectivity and fact to one’s first-order moral 
beliefs.  The problem that these versions of the MCS objection raise is that these second-
order beliefs are most certainly rendered false (or at least severely undermined) by the 
knowledge that other people are equally justified in holding the coherent systems of 
belief they do.  In short, coherentist realism requires that only one system of beliefs be 
coherent and thus justified, or those second-order realist beliefs on which it relies look 
incredibly implausible. 
Consider why this is so.  Imagine two moral realists (Martha and Christine) with 
coherent but contradictory systems of morality.  Martha believes it is a fact of the matter 
that eating my dog Herbert is morally wrong.  Christine believes that it is a fact of the 
matter that it is morally permissible.  Each holds the second-order belief that she has 
discovered a moral fact about eating Herbert in virtue of the fact’s overall coherence 
with her system of morality.  Now suppose that Martha knows about the existence of 
Christine (and vice versa) and that each knows that the other’s system of belief is just as 
coherent as hers, but incorporates a belief which contradicts hers.  Because Martha 
thinks that her moral belief is a fact of the matter, she must believe that Christine is 
wrong, and Christine must believe the same thing about Martha’s belief.  Now it is easy 
to ask: who is right?  Both are equally justified, so there seems to be no basis for 
concluding that either one or the other is right.  This means that for the question over 
which their answers diverge (the permissibility of Herbert-eating), there can be no one 
realist answer. 
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Such a possibility shows one of two things: either (1) one of the aforementioned 
realists is wrong, and there is genuinely no way to tell which one it is (in which case 
moral facts are sometimes genuinely indeterminate), or (2) moral objectivism is false (in 
which case we retain determinacy of moral facts by relativizing those facts to a 
particular coherent systems of morality).   
Though he thinks that these cases are far more rare than I do, Brink favors the 
first answer.  He argues that in these types of cases, one side is simply systematically 
mistaken.  There is a fact of the matter as to who is correct, but one side is simply wrong 
about almost everything, and the other right about almost everything.  He does, however, 
note that the more that one claims that one’s opponent is simply systematically mistaken, 
the less justified one’s system of belief appears to be.  This is certainly the case when 
matters of disagreement are between large and more or less comprehensive ideologies 
like liberalism and conservatism; one cannot merely hand-wave these disputes away by 
saying that either liberals or conservatives are systematically mistaken (Brink 1989, 
200). 
Brink also notes that for some moral disputes, the realist might accept that “there 
are no uniquely correct answers” (Brink 1989, 202).  He admits that this strategy must be 
confined to only a few cases, because if a realist were forced to be agnostic about most 
moral facts, he would hold a very strange variant of realism (ibid.).   
I do not think either of these strategies is adequate.  First, it is not clear that 
admitting even one case of systematic mistakenness is acceptable to the moral realist.  
Calling a position “systematically mistaken” seems to be terminologically begging the 
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question.  In order to be systematically mistaken, one must hold a view so different from 
another view that no amount of reasoned dialogue could possibly bring about 
convergence.  In these cases, calling one side mistaken cannot add up to more than an ad 
hominem.  After all, the whole problem is that it is impossible to tell (from an objective 
standpoint) exactly who is mistaken!   
Second, Brink appears to think that as long as the number of irresolvable moral 
disputes is small, the fact that there are no uniquely correct answers is acceptable for the 
realist.  Though I believe we have evidence sufficient to believe that moral 
disagreements are large in quantity, this surely cannot be the deciding factor.  Rather, 
some moral matters are more important than others; if the permissibility of stealing 
candy from convenience stores has no uniquely determined answer, this might be 
acceptable.  But based on the cases of moral dumbfounding that Haidt reports, 
irresolvable differences may in fact be over questions far more pressing than that.  We 
should see that in accepting coherentist moral realism we are in danger of licensing 
relativism over very basic questions of value: certainly the permissibility of “deviant” 
sexual practices, perhaps even the permissibility of access to abortion, the permissibility 
of certain wars, the structure of taxation, etc.  Indeed, much of what has been popularly 
labeled the “culture wars” in the United States may come down to fundamentally 
irresolvable and intransigent intuitions.  Justified relativism in these areas has dramatic 
social and political ramifications, and cannot simply be brushed off by the coherentist 
realist as an acceptable price to pay for realism.  If coherentist moral realism is to remain 
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a viable contender in the field of moral epistemology, it must come up with resources to 
deal with these two MCS objections. 
3.5 Section Conclusion 
As we have seen, there are good reasons to think that moral judgments cause 
emotions, and that the moral judgments with which we identify are always caused by 
intuitive moral judgments.  This possibility leads to two serious problems, both of which 
constitute MCS objections to coherentist moral realism.  
It is important to note exactly what this critique is committed to.  First, neither 
the problem of intransigence nor the limited problem of intransigence is a claim about 
the necessary relations between intuition and reasoned judgment.  The claim in the 
problem of intransigence is not that reasoned judgment is necessarily caused by 
intuition, just that as a matter of empirical fact, it always is.  And similarly, the limited 
problem of intransigence is not that all moral systems necessarily have intransigent 
intuitions, but that as a matter of empirical fact, they all do.  As such, both could be 
argued against by denying the empirical claims on which they rest.  The former could 
easily be falsified by pointing to an example of a reasoned judgment which is not caused 
by an intuition, and the latter could be falsified by showing that at least one coherent 
moral system does not contain any intransigent intuitions at all.  Second, it is important 
to emphasize that these two problems do not rely on traditional claims in metaethics; 
neither claims that moral judgments are emotions, or that moral judgments are “always 
motivating.”  It rather takes a more limited approach, claiming that moral judgments 
cause emotions, but that intuitive moral judgments are always causally primary (or in the 
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case of the limited problem, primary often enough).  It thus avoids the non-cognitivist 
quagmire into which so much twentieth century metaethical debate has sunk, and 
represents an empirically-based cognitivist critique of coherentist moral realism.   
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4. CONCLUSION 
 In this thesis I have argued that we have good reasons to prefer a coherentist 
moral realist account of justification in moral epistemology.  Such an account is not 
committed to constructivism in ethics, avoids the problems of foundationalism, and can 
be modified so as to successfully resist three of the most important traditional objections 
to coherentism.  Even so, I pointed to two types of MCS objection which accept that 
moral judgments have all the features a moral realist expects them to, but appears to 
cause a real problem for the view nonetheless.   
 I remain hopeful that we may find a way out of the two versions of the MCS 
objection that I proposed in section three.  But I also think that any successful version of 
coherentist moral realism must meet two important obstacles brought up by these 
objections.  First, it must explain how moral reasoning can improve the coherence of a 
person’s system of belief when all of the reasoned judgments in such a system are 
caused by intuitions.  Second, it must explain how we can derive a single coherent moral 
system which is more justified than all the alternatives.  Or, failing that, it must at least 
identify a set of equally justified coherent systems which do not differ in their answers to 
our most serious moral questions.  In my later work, deriving just such a system (or set 
of systems) will be my goal. 
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